Numerical Calculations of Finite Key Rate for General Quantum Key
  Distribution Protocols by George, Ian et al.
Numerical Calculations of Finite Key Rate for General Quantum Key Distribution
Protocols
Ian George, Jie Lin, and Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus
Institute for Quantum Computing and Department of Physics and Astronomy,
University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
(Dated: April 27, 2020)
Finite key analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) is an important tool for any QKD imple-
mentation. While much work has been done on the framework of finite key analysis, the application
to individual protocols often relies on the the specific protocol being simple or highly symmet-
ric as well as represented in small finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. In this work, we extend our
pre-existing reliable, efficient, tight, and generic numerical method for calculating the asymptotic
key rate of device-dependent QKD protocols in finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces to the finite key
regime using the security analysis framework of Renner. We explain how this extension preserves
the reliability, efficiency, and tightness of the asymptotic method. We then explore examples which
illustrate both the generality of our method as well as the importance of parameter estimation and
data processing within the framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
As large scale quantum computers become an actual-
ity, we need to change our cryptographic infrastructure
to be safe against attacks which involve adversaries who
have such computers at their disposal [1]. One of the
cryptographic tools for this change in infrastructure is
quantum key distribution (QKD), the security of which
will not be threatened by future technological or algo-
rithmic developments [2–5]. See Ref. [6] for a review of
QKD and Refs. [7, 8] for the recent progress.
A main task of the security analysis is to calculate the
secret key rates that can be securely achieved with a given
protocol. In analyzing QKD protocols, security proofs
are often done first in the asymptotic regime, that is, in
the limit of an infinite amount of quantum signals being
exchanged between a sender and a receiver (traditionally
known as Alice and Bob). However, in any realistic im-
plementation of a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob can only
have a finite amount of data for characterizing their chan-
nel and for performing classical post-processing. It is of
practical relevance to prove composable security in the
finite regime [9] so that the key generated by QKD with
properly evaluated security parameters can be used safely
in other cryptographic applications such as encryption
using one-time pad. Toward this goal, several protocols
[10–13] have been proved to be secure in the finite regime
using the ε-security framework expounded in [9, 11].
However, analytical methods for calculating the se-
cret key rates are highly technical in both asymptotic
and finite regimes, and they are often restricted to cer-
tain protocols with symmetry. To aid the study of more
QKD protocols (especially those without symmetry) and
also to study side-channel imperfections of protocols,
numerical methods [14–17] based on convex optimiza-
tion and specifically semidefinite program (SDP) have
been developed. In particular, numerical methods in
Ref. [15] provide tight and reliable key rates for gen-
eral finite-dimensional QKD protocols. Nevertheless, all
these methods are currently restricted to the asymptotic
regime. Thus, it is important to extend numerical meth-
ods to finite regime in order to preserve the advantages
of numerical methods.
In this work, we extend the numerical asymptotic key
rate calculation method in Ref. [15] to the finite regime.
For the finite key analysis, we adopt Renner’s framework
[9]. Our method retains advantages of the previous nu-
merical method [15]; that is, it provides a reliable lower
bound on the key rate for general finite-dimensional QKD
and the key rate is tight within the framework [9]. Unlike
other works [12, 18, 19], our method does not make an
approximation that leads to a loose bound in the parame-
ter estimation subprotocol for certain cases. Specifically,
our method remains tight when the positive-operator val-
ued measure (POVM) used in the protocol has more than
two outcomes. This makes our solver applicable for gen-
eral QKD protocols. Furthermore, we show that, with-
out changing the security parameter of the parameter
estimation step, one can decrease the set of states over
which one must minimize the key rate in many practical
cases. We implement this improvement to the analysis
of parameter estimation in our numerical method. Our
numerical method also can calculate the finite key rate
for protocols that accept a set of observed statistics in
the parameter estimation subprotocol. This presents an
opportunity that is commonly overlooked, though it is of
practical relevance for actual implementations. In sum-
mary, we improve the analysis of the parameter estima-
tion subprotocol in finite key analysis and present a reli-
able generic numerical method for calculating the finite
key rate of QKD protocols represented in finite Hilbert
spaces.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we re-
view background related to finite key analysis including a
review of the finite key analysis framework from Ref. [9].
We then discuss our extension of the numerical method
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2from Ref. [15] to the finite regime in Sec. III. To exem-
plify the key ideas in our finite key analysis, we apply
our method to analyze different variations of Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) [20] protocol including the single-
photon prepare-and-measure [20], measurement-device-
independent (MDI) [21] and discrete-phase-randomized
[22] variants in Sec. IV. Finally we make concluding
remarks in Sec. V. We leave technical details in the
appendices, including the derivations of the numerical
method and certain improved terms in the bound on the
key length.
II. BACKGROUND
A. General QKD Protocol in the Finite Regime
We start by reviewing the ε-security framework of
QKD [9]. QKD is a cryptographic protocol for secret key
distribution in which Alice and Bob establish a shared se-
cret key by generating a pair of keys SA and SB such that
the keys agree (correctness) and are completely unknown
to an eavesdropper (secrecy). Neither of these properties
can be achieved perfectly, so we instead talk of a QKD
protocol which is ε = ε′+ε′′-secure as it is ε′-correct and
ε′′-secret where the ε’s quantify the amount the proto-
col deviates from the ideal property. A QKD protocol is
ε-secure if a distinguisher, which is either given the real
or the ideal protocol as a block box to test, can guess
correctly which protocol it was given with probability at
most (1/2 + ε) [23, 24]. Formally, a QKD protocol is
ε-secure if
1
2
‖ρSASBE − piSASB ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ε
where piSASB =
∑
s∈S
1
|S| |s〉 〈s| ⊗ |s〉 〈s|, S is the set of
secret keys the protocol could generate, and ‖ · ‖1 is the
trace norm defined as ‖A‖1 = Tr
(√
A†A
)
. The output
secret key of a ε-secure QKD protocol has composable
security under the abstract cryptography framework [23,
24].
In an entanglement-based QKD protocol, Alice (or
Eve) constructs an entangled state ρAB . Alice and Bob
then measure their respective halves of ρAB . In the case
that Alice prepares the state, we refer to the half of
the state sent from Alice to Bob as a signal. We note
that the entanglement-based description of QKD we use
in this section is without loss of generality as prepare-
and-measure protocols are equivalent via the source-
replacement scheme [25, 26] as will be reviewed in Section
III.
When Alice sends signals to Bob, the eavesdropper,
traditionally known as Eve, has the chance to perform
her attack. There are two classes of attacks generally
considered in security analysis— collective and coherent.
In both cases one assumes Eve has an unbounded quan-
tum memory, so she can store all her systems indefinitely.
Collective attacks assume Eve uses a new ancillary sys-
tem to interact with each signal sent by Alice as it is sent
across the channel after which she can measure her an-
cillary systems collectively whenever she should choose
(even after Alice and Bob have completed their proto-
col). Coherent attacks assume Eve interacts with all of
the signals as one large state after which she can measure
whenever she pleases. As Eve interacts with all of the sig-
nals as one large state, the signals may be entangled in
some arbitrary manner. As coherent attacks is the most
general form of attack permitted by quantum mechanics,
one ultimately needs to prove security against coherent
attacks.
FIG. 1. General QKD Protocol.
With the security and attack models in mind, we can
consider what subprotocols of a QKD protocol contribute
to the its overall ε-security. To aid our discussion, we now
describe steps in a general QKD protocol. Following Fig.
1, without loss of generality, the general QKD protocol
can be described as follows:
1. State Preparation and Transmission: Alice pre-
pares an entangled quantum state ρAB and sends
half of it to Bob. Alice does this N times.
2. Measurement and Data Partitioning : Alice and
Bob measure each of the N entangled quantum
states ρAB and store the data pertaining to each
measurement. In view of future communication,
they partition their respective data from each mea-
surement, indexed by i, into private information,
Ai, Bi, and public information A˜i, B˜i which they
later announce publicly.
33. Parameter Estimation: Alice and Bob announce
their fine-grained data about some random subset
of theN signals of sizem to construct the frequency
distribution f(a, b). If f(a, b) is in a set of pre-
agreed upon accepted statistics, Q, Alice and Bob
proceed. Otherwise, they abort the protocol.
4. Announcements and General Sifting : Alice and
Bob announce the public information that they
prepared in Step 2 and throw out results of some
subset of the N − m signals based on this pub-
lic information. The remaining private informa-
tion forms their raw keys x˜ ∈ {0, ..., kA − 1}n and
y˜ ∈ {0, ..., kB − 1}n where kA and kB are the num-
ber of possible outcomes for Alice and Bob’s mea-
surements respectively.
5. Key Map: Alice computes the key map,1 a function
of their private data as well as the public data of
both parties to obtain a key, x ∈ {0, 1, ..., d − 1}n
where d is the size of the alphabet for the key.
6. Error Correction: Alice and Bob publicly commu-
nicate to try and get y˜ and x to agree and thus Bob
obtains x′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., d− 1}n.
7. Privacy Amplification: Alice and Bob produce
their final keys by using a two-universal hash func-
tion on the key map result x (Theorem 5.5.1 of [9]).
Privacy amplification ends with Alice and Bob hav-
ing keys SA and SB respectively.
The subprotocols which contribute to the security pa-
rameter ε are parameter estimation, error correction, and
privacy amplification. There is also one more source of
uncertainty based on how much one ‘smooths’ the min-
entropy, ε¯. Therefore, using the standard security proof
[9, 10], we wind up with an ε = εPE+ε¯+εEC+εPA-secure
protocol which is εEC-correct and εPA + εPE + ε¯-secure.
Each term may be viewed in the following manner:
1. εPE is the probability of the parameter estimation
protocol not aborting and the state which Alice and
Bob tested m times not being included in the secu-
rity analysis.
2. ε¯ is the probability of Eve knowing the key because
for each state feasible according to parameter esti-
mation, ρAB , Alice and Bob a priori consider the
min-entropy of the state ρAB that maximizes the
min-entropy over the set of states ε¯-similar to ρAB .
3. εEC is the probability that Alice and Bob do not
abort the protocol and obtain outputs that differ,
i.e. x 6= x′.
1 Alternatively, Bob can compute the key map. This is commonly
referred to as reverse reconciliation, and in this case Alice and
Bob’s roles are reversed in steps 5. and 6.
4. εPA is the probability that Alice and Bob do not
abort the protocol and that the key is known to
Eve because the privacy amplification failed.
We note each ε term puts a bound on the security of Eve
knowing anything about the key, which one treats as if
Eve learned everything about the key. While this inter-
pretation of the bound may seem pessimistic, depending
on the data being encrypted with the key, only one bit
of the original message being known may be a security
threat, and so this is the appropriate security [27, 28].
With the protocol described and the ε-terms accounted
for, we can define the calculation for determining the up-
per bound on the length of a secret key generated by a
ε-secure QKD protocol. We begin by defining the set of
density matrices which one must minimize the key rate
over given the choice that Q is a set of frequency dis-
tributions within some distance t from a preferred, fixed
frequency distribution F ,
Sµ = {ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) |∃F ∈ P(Σ) such that (1)
‖ΦP(ρ)−N (F )‖1 ≤ µ & ‖F − F‖1 ≤ t}
Throughout this work, D(HA ⊗ HB) denotes the set
of density matrices on Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB . The
map ΦP(X) ≡
∑
j∈Σ Tr
(
XΓ˜j
)
|j〉〈j| maps density ma-
trices to a register of the corresponding probability dis-
tribution under the POVM, {Γ˜j}j∈Σ. In other words,
ΦP : D(HA ⊗HB) → P(Σ) where P(Σ) denotes the set
of probability distributions over the finite set Σ which we
refer to as an alphabet. We refer to ΦP as the probability
map. The map N (X) = ∑x∈Σ,y∈Λ p(y|x) 〈x|X |x〉 |y〉〈y|
is a map N : P(Σ)→ P(Λ) according to the conditional
probability distribution p(y|x). This is the quantum
channel representation of a classical-to-classical channel
[29]. By the data processing inequality, one knows that
processing data with a map like N can be viewed as
throwing out some information. We therefore refer to
N as a ‘coarse-graining channel’ within this work, as will
be elaborated in the next subsection. The frequency dis-
tributions are denoted by F, F ∈ P(Σ). Throughout this
paper we denote POVM elements pertaining to frequency
distributions we hold as being susceptible to statistical
fluctuations with Γ˜ and observables pertaining to expec-
tations or probabilities we hold certain with Γ. Further-
more, throughout the rest of the paper, when talking
about ‖P −F‖1 or ‖F −F‖1, we will refer to these as the
variational distance as P, F , and F are probability dis-
tributions. For this reason we refer to µ as the variation
bound and t as the variation threshold.
With the notation in Eqn. 1 accounted for, we see that
Q is represented by a set of frequency distributions that
have variational distance from a preferred frequency dis-
tribution F within the variation threshold, t, in Eqn. 1.
The other inequality in Eqn. 1 determines a limit to the
variational distance between the probability distribution
induced by ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) under the probability map
ΦP and the coarse-graining of some F ∈ Q. In other
4words, Eqn. 1 determines the set of σ which, under the
map ΦP , there exists an F ∈ Q such that the distance
between ΦP and N (F ) is less than the variation bound.
An in-depth explanation of why this set is what one op-
timizes over is given in Section II B.
We note that the ‖F −F‖1 ≤ t constraint in Eqn. 1 is
a choice in formalizing the set of accepted distributions
during parameter estimation, Q. While fundamentally Q
may be any set, this threshold from some specific statis-
tics F is a practical choice without much loss in generality
as normally one would accept any probability distribu-
tion within some distance from an ideal probability dis-
tribution (such as the perfectly correlated statistics, or
low phase error).
We can now present the key rate under the assumption
of identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) col-
lective attack. We will explain how to lift the collective
attack analysis to coherent attacks in Section III E.
Adaptation of Theorem 6.5.1 of [9] for Collective At-
tacks: Assuming i.i.d. collective attack, the QKD proto-
col is ε = εPE + ε¯ + εEC + εPA-secure given that, when
the protocol does not abort, the output key is of length
` where
` ≤ n(Hµ(X|E)− δ(ε¯))− leakεEC − 2 log2(1/εPA) (2)
with the following definitions:
Hµ(X|E) = min
ρ∈Sµ
H(X|E)ρ
leakεEC = nfECH(X|Y ) + log2
(
2
εEC
)
δ(ε¯) = 2 log2(d+ 3)
√
log2(2/ε¯)
n
(3)
µ =
√
2
√
ln(1/εPE) + |Σ| ln(m+ 1)
m
(4)
where d is the size of the alphabet for Alice and Bob’s out-
put key. We note that the variation bound µ is different
from existing literature as we are not using an entry-wise
approximation, but rather are bounding the entire varia-
tional distance and the previous statements of bounding
the variational distance in general had a typo. Our δ(ε¯)
term is smaller than any other reported work that we
know of as we use the tightest bound in [9] and using
the correction noted in Footnote 27 of [10]. We note that
leakεEC as defined is an upper bound on the amount of
information leaked during the error-correction step tak-
ing into account the inefficiency in the error correction
for realistic block lengths using the parameter fEC ≥ 1.
In an actual QKD experiment, the information leaked is
an experimentally known parameter. We derive all terms
which differ from other works in Appendix B.
B. Parameter Estimation
It is important to consider parameter estimation’s role
in the security proof in greater detail as it is deceivingly
simple and is the primary focus of this work’s examples.
In this section we clarify its role, review how it has been
used in previous works, and present a theorem which
resolves a standing conceptual issue.
As stated in the previous section, in parameter esti-
mation as presented in the Renner framework [9], Alice
and Bob sacrifice m of the signals to get a sequence,
z = (z1, z2, ..., zm) ∈ Σm. From this sequence Alice and
Bob construct their frequency distribution F over Σ. If
F is in a pre-agreed set of distributions, Q, Alice and
Bob continue the protocol. Otherwise, they abort.
The εPE term in the security statement arises from dis-
regarding any state that would lead to an accepted fre-
quency distribution with a probability less than εPE. For-
mally, one could say a state σ is εPE-filtered for a given
set of measurements by Alice and Bob, {Γ˜j}, and set
of accepted probabilities, Q, if Pr[Accept|σ] ≤ εPE. Here
Pr[Accept|σ] is the probability that Alice and Bob accept
a frequency distribution which is produced by sampling
from σ with the POVM defined in the protocol. A state
which is ignored for this reason is referred to as being
εPE-filtered. This disregarding is necessary as otherwise
Alice and Bob would always have to consider the maxi-
mally mixed state and be unable to generate a key.
One may note that the security statement in parame-
ter estimation is therefore about all statistics which Alice
and Bob would accept as can be formally seen in Eqn.
1. This has been obfuscated in many of the works on
finite key analysis where the security is always implic-
itly presented for a protocol in which only one frequency
distribution is accepted. We refer to such a protocol as
a protocol with unique acceptance as there is a unique
frequency distribution which Alice and Bob will accept.
While rigorous, we believe the security analysis of proto-
cols with unique acceptance to not be the complete pic-
ture as a protocol which only accepts a single frequency
distribution will abort an impractical amount of the time.
However, there remains a further conceptual issue in
parameter estimation. In parameter estimation’s most
straightforward implementation, Alice and Bob simply
take the outcomes of their joint measurements for some
subset of the N signals to get their sequence z and thus
their probability distribution F . We refer to the sequence
z as fine-grained data as it pertains to the most detailed
information one can acquire via the measurements per-
mitted by the protocol. However, Alice and Bob could
also construct a variety of alternative distributions by
coarse-graining the fine-grained probability distribution
F over the alphabet Σ to a probability distribution FC
over a smaller alphabet Λ. Formally, coarse-graining is
simply data processing F using a conditional probabil-
ity distribution pΛ|Σ which can be done with the coarse-
graining channel N . Therefore one can construct the
coarse-grained statistics FC and corresponding effective
POVM {Γ˜Ci }i∈Λ for constructing the probability map us-
ing the conditional probability distribution pΛ|Σ by the
5FIG. 2. Parameter Estimation Visualized: Here we consider
parameter estimation for two coarse-grainings. For clarity we
consider a protocol with unique acceptance which only accepts
F . Each coarse-graining of F has its own set Sµk which would
correspond to Eqn. 1 for that given coarse-graining. One can
see that the POVM and the variational bound µk determines
the set Sµk . Furthermore, we now visually see how by con-
sidering both coarse-grainings, SεPE , one can decrease the set
of density matrices optimized over for the same security pa-
rameter and therefore possibly increase the keyrate.
following two equations:
FC = N (F ) Γ˜Ci =
∑
j∈Σ
pΛ|Σ(j|i)Γ˜j
Given the proof method for constructing the set in
Eqn. 1, coarse-graining may lead to a better a key rate
than using just the fine-grained data as will be shown
in Section IV. This would imply that, within the proof
method, throwing out information can make one more
secure against Eve which is counter-intuitive. However,
in an actual protocol, even when Alice and Bob coarse-
grain their statistics, they still have access to the fine-
grained data. We would expect therefore that one can
construct a set which considers the fine-grained data and
the coarse-grained data and maintains the same security
statement.2 Such a set could only improve the key rate
and would resolve the idea that throwing out informa-
tion can help within this proof method. Here we prove
such a set exists by taking the intersection of sets con-
structed via different coarse-grainings but with the same
security promise under the assumption of i.i.d. collective
attacks. A generalization of this theorem for considering
the intersection of any set of sets, {Sk}, such that ∀k the
2 We note that in [12] they considered fine-grained data and coarse-
grained data by increasing the security term.
set’s complement, Sk, includes only states ξ such that
Pr[Accept|ξ] ≤ εPE is straightforward.
Theorem 1 (Security with Multiple Coarse-Grainings).
Fix εPE > 0. Let Ξ be a finite alphabet indexing these
multiple coarse-grainings. For each k ∈ Ξ, let
Sµk = {ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) | ∃Fk ∈ P(Σ) :
‖ΦPk(ρ)−Nk(Fk)‖1 ≤ µk & ‖N (Fk)−N (F )‖1 ≤ t}
where F ∈ P(Σ) is used to define the set of
statistics accepted, ΦPk(ρ) =
∑
i∈Λk Tr
(
ρΓ˜Cki
)
|i〉〈i|
is the corresponding probability map, Nk(X) =∑
i,j pΛk|Σ(j|i) 〈i|X |i〉 |j〉〈j| is the corresponding coarse-
graining channel, N is a coarse-graining channel used
so that one can abort on statistics that differ from the
ones considered for the variation bounds µk, and µk is
determined using Eqn. 4 so that, by Theorem 8, ∀σ 6∈
Sµk ,Pr[Accept|σ⊗m] ≤ εPE. Define Smulti =
⋂
k Sµk . If
σ 6∈ Smulti, then Pr[Accept|σ⊗m] ≤ εPE.
Proof. For any set X ⊆ D(HA ⊗ HB), let X ≡ {x ∈
D(HA ⊗ HB)|x 6∈ X}. We know by the construc-
tion of the sets Sµk (Eqn. 4 and Theorem 8) that
∀k ∈ Ξ, ∀σ ∈ Sµk , Pr[Accept|σ⊗m] ≤ εPE. It immedi-
ately follows that ∀σ ∈ ⋃k Sµk ,Pr[Accept|σ⊗m] ≤ εPE.
Note that
⋂
k Sµk =
⋃
k Sµk . Therefore ∀σ 6∈
⋂
k Sµk ,
Pr[Accept|σ⊗m] ≤ εPE.
With the preceding theorem, we can define the general
set to optimize over:
SεPE = {ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) | ∀k ∈ Ξ,∃Fk ∈ P(Σ) :
(5)
‖ΦPk(ρ)−Nk(Fk)‖1 ≤ µk &‖N (Fk)−N (F )‖1 ≤ t}
where Ξ is an alphabet for indexing the number of coarse-
grainings. Note that F is fixed.
There are two important observations to be made. The
first is that for ρ ∈ SεPE one does not need a single F ∈ Q
which satisfies all k variation bounds with respect to ρ
but rather (F1, ...., F|Ξ|) ∈ Q×|Ξ| so that Fk satisfies the
kth variation bound with respect to ρ. This is a property
of the proof method we have used as we intersect the sets.
An alternative proof method that only considers one F
that satisfies all constraints at the same time remains an
open problem. The second observation is that to define
SεPE each Sµk being intersected must be defined using a
coarse-graining which acts on fine-grained statistics over
the same alphabet Σ. Otherwise more testing would be
necessary which would relate to a different set and a dif-
ferent security claim. To visualize Eqn. 5, see Figure 2,
which presents Eqn. 5 for a protocol with unique accep-
tance.
C. Asymptotic Analysis
Lastly we review how the asymptotic analysis arises
from finite key analysis since the general numerical
6framework for finite key analysis is an extension of the
asymptotic method. This can be seen as follows. De-
fine the asymptotic key rate as R∞ = limN→∞ `(N)/N .
As the total number of signals sent, N , goes to infinity,
the number of signals used for parameter estimation, m,
will grow (although an increasingly smaller fraction of
the total signals sent will be consumed for parameter es-
timation). Given Eqn. 4, as the the number of signals
m increases to infinity, the variation bound µ will go to
0. The fundamental limit for n/N will be the probabil-
ity that any signal can actually be used for key genera-
tion, which we refer to as ppass. It is then clear that the
asymptotic key rate is
R∞ = ppass(min
ρ∈S
H(X|E)− fECH(X|Y )) (6)
where
S ≡ {ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB)|Tr(ρΓi) = γi, ∀i ∈ Λ}
and Λ is an alphabet for indexing the constraints.
This statement is equivalent to the famed Devetak-
Winter bound [30] which in this case has been derived
from the finite key analysis. Furthermore, as we will see
in Section III E, the finite key analysis can be extended to
take into account coherent attacks and still achieve this
bound in the limit. We can therefore conclude asymp-
totic analysis pertains to coherent attacks. In the expres-
sion for asymptotic key rates, {Γi} no longer need to form
a POVM, but rather can be any observables that are in
the space spanned by the original POVM. This is the case
as in the asymptotic limit there are no fluctuations, so
one can calculate the expectation value of any observable
from a linear combination of the probabilities determined
by the POVM. Lastly, there exists a numerical method
for calculating this key rate using semidefinite program-
ming for general QKD protocols [14, 15]. In what follows,
we show how to extend this numerical method to finite
key so that we can then investigate examples to better
understand parameter estimation.
III. NUMERICAL METHOD
To be able to determine the key rate for an arbitrary
device-dependent QKD protocol using a unified numer-
ical method, it is important to be able to represent all
protocols in the same manner. All QKD protocols can
be formulated as entanglement based protocols using the
source-replacement scheme. This means that as our nu-
merical framework can handle entanglement-based pro-
tocols, it can also handle prepare-and-measure protocols.
First we review the source-replacement scheme. We then
review the numerical method for asymptotic analysis un-
der this representation. Lastly, we show how to extend
the numerical analysis to consider the finite key regime.
A. Source-replacement Scheme
The source replacement scheme is a formulation of
the prepare and measure protocol in the language of
entanglement-based protocols. It was first made use of
in the analysis of BB84 [31] and Gaussian CV-QKD [32].
The general method for the equivalence was then ex-
pounded in [25, 26]. By formulating the prepare and mea-
sure protocol in language of entanglement-based proto-
cols, whatever the key rate is for the entanglement-based
protocol is also the key rate for the original prepare-and-
measure protocol.
Imagine a prepare-and-measure protocol in which Al-
ice sends the ensemble {px, |ϕx〉} where px is the a pri-
ori probability of sending the signal state |ϕx〉. By the
source-replacement scheme, it is equivalent for Alice to
prepare the entangled state:
|Φ〉AS =
∑
x
√
px |x〉A |ϕx〉S
Alice first sends Bob’s portion of the state, the signal
space S, to Bob through a quantum channel E leading to
the resulting joint state:
ρAB = (idA ⊗ ES→B)(|Φ〉 〈Φ|AS)
where idA is the identity channel on the A space. After
Alice performs a local projective measurement on the A
space, she effectively sends |ϕx〉 to Bob with probability
px just like in the prepare-and-measure scheme. Conse-
quently Bob receives the conditional state
ρxB =
1
px
TrA[ρAB(|x〉 〈x| ⊗ 1B)]
Assume that in the original prepare-and-measure pro-
tocol Alice and Bob ended up with a joint probability
distribution p(x, b) where b ∈ Σ and |Σ| is the number of
POVM elements for Bob’s POVM {ΓBb }b∈Σ. It follows
by the source-replacement scheme that asymptotically it
is equivalent for us to constrain ρAB by
Tr
(
ρAB(|x〉 〈x| ⊗ ΓBb )
)
= p(x, b) ∀x, b
when minimizing H(X|E) over the set S of compatible
states.
B. Asymptotic Numerics
To calculate secret key rates, we have to minimize
H(X|E) with the given constraints on the underlying
state. This is often difficult when there are not sufficient
symmetries to simplify the problem. To address this is-
sue, a two-step method to produce a tight, efficient, and
reliable lower bound on H(X|E) has been created [15].
In this work there are a few key ideas which will be of
particular import in our extension to include finite size
effects. The first is that H(X|E) can be represented by
7the relative entropy as X is classical information [33].
This is done using following function:
f(ρ) = D(G(ρ)‖Z(G(ρ))) (7)
where D(·||·) is the quantum relative entropy, G is a com-
pletely positive trace non-increasing map that describes
the post-processing steps of the protocol and Z is a quan-
tum pinching channel which is related to obtaining the
results of key map (see Appendix A of [34] for further
detail). By the joint convexity of quantum relative en-
tropy, the function f(ρ) is a convex function in ρ and thus
can be used as the objective function for a semidefinite
program for our minimization of the conditional entropy.
Therefore we define
α ≡ min
ρ∈S
f(ρ) (8)
However, as we want a lower bound that also holds if
our numerical optimization routines returns before reach-
ing the true mathematical minimum, we need to acquire
the dual problem of the SDP so that we have a maximiza-
tion problem. This would guarantee the computer al-
ways returns an answer approaching from below the true
minimum of the conditional entropy so that we can al-
ways guarantee that our answer provides a reliable lower
bound on the key rate. Unfortunately, the quantum rel-
ative entropy is a highly non-linear function and so de-
termining the dual of this problem is difficult in general.
For this reason, we linearize the function about a given
density matrix. We can then acquire the dual of the lin-
earization of the original problem SDP, max~y∈S∗(σ) ~γ · ~y
where
S∗(σ) ≡ {~y ∈ R|Λ||
∑
i
yiΓi ≤ ∇f(σ)} (9)
where ~γ is just the vector of the set of expectation values
{γi}i∈Λ.
Then the lower bound for any optimal or suboptimal
attack σ can be calculated as
β(σ) ≡ f(σ)− Tr(σ∇f(σ)) + max
~y∈S∗
~γ · ~y (10)
because it can be shown that for all ρ ∈ S, α ≥ β(ρ) so
long as ∇f(ρ) exists (Theorem 1 of [15]). Here we have
defined the gradient of f at point ρ represented in the
standard basis {|k〉} as:3
∇f(ρ) ≡
∑
j,k
djk |k〉 〈j| , with djk ≡ ∂f(σ)
∂σjk
∣∣∣∣
σ=ρ
3 Note that we have defined the derivative differently than in [15]
by absorbing the occuring transposition into the definition of the
gradient. This removes transpositions in many equations. Every
statement is kept consistent with this definition throughout the
paper.
and σjk ≡ 〈j|σ |k〉. Moreover, we can write the gradient
of f(ρ) as:
∇f(ρ) ≡ G†(log2 G(ρ))− G†(log2Z(G(ρ))) (11)
Lastly, one can guarantee ∇f(ρ) exists via perturbing
the state sufficiently by mixing the output of G(ρ) with
the maximally mixed state such that all eigenvalues are
non-zero.
The expression of β(σ) in Eqn. 10 gives a valid lower
bound for the key rate for any σ, but the bound will be
tighter the closer σ is to the true optimum. We thus use
a near-optimal evaluation of the primal problem (Eqn.
8) . This is referred to as Step 1 (see Algorithm 1). For
further information on the specifics of this method, we
refer to Appendix A and [15].
Algorithm 1: Asymptotic Key Rate lower bound
Result: lower bound on min
ρ∈S
H(X|E) [15]
1. Let  > 0, ρ0 ∈ S, maxIter ∈ N, and i = 0.
Step 1
2. Compute ∆ρ := arg minδρ Tr[(δρ)∇f(ρi)] subject
to ∆ρ+ ρi ∈ S.
3. If Tr[(∆ρ)∇f(ρi)] < , then proceed to Step 2
4. Find λ ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes f(ρi + λ∆ρ)
5. Set ρi+1 = ρi + λ∆ρ, i→ i+ 1.
6. If i > maxIter, proceed to Step 2
Step 2
7. Let ρ be the result of Step 1. Let ζ ≥ 0 be the
maximum constraint violation of ρ from the
original set S constraints which satisfy this.
8. Calculate ∇f(ρ) to use for constructing S∗
9. Expand S∗ such that states which violated the
original constraints by ζ are included.
10. Calculate β using the SDP defined above Equation
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C. Extension to Finite Key
1. Tight, reliable, and efficient lower bound
We now extend the previous numerical framework to
the finite regime and show rigorously that this extension
preserves the advantages of previous numerical method;
that is, it provides tight, efficient and reliable key rates.
For clarity, we will begin by proving the tightness in the
case where there are no numerical errors and a single
coarse-graining. Here tightness is defined as the property
that if one acquires the optimal solution in Step 1 of the
algorithm, then Step 2 will obtain the same answer. We
then generalize to the case for handling issues due to
numerics and multiple POVMs in Appendix A.
8The primary steps in extending our method to the
finite key regime are changing the sets over which we
optimize and changing how we perform Item 9 in Al-
gorithm 1. In the case of prepare-and-measure proto-
cols, we first modify Sµ as defined in Equation 1 as Alice
knows her portion of the state ρA perfectly under the
source-replacement scheme. Therefore, while the param-
eter estimation is handled in the original definition, it
must take into account Alice’s certainty on ρA. Thus
we define a variation of Eqn. 1 for prepare-and-measure
protocols:
SPMµ ≡ {ρ ∈ Pos(HA ⊗HB) | ∃F ∈ P(Σ) : (12)
‖ΦP(ρ)−N (F )‖1 ≤ µ, ‖N (F )−N (F )‖1 ≤ t,
Tr(ρΓi) = γi, ∀i ∈ Λ}
where we use Λ for indexing constraints which are certain.
We note ρ is a density matrix by setting Γ1 = 1HA⊗HB ,
γ1 = 1. Furthermore, the use of N and N is so that one
might abort on some set of coarse-grained or fine-grained
data which differs from the data used in relation to the
variation bound. We stress that as F and N are fixed,
N (F ) is a fixed frequency distribution. From this we can
define the primal problem of the linearized SDP as:
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to Tr(Γiσ) = γi ∀i ∈ Λ
‖ΦP(σ)−N (F )‖1 ≤ µ
‖N (F )−N (F )‖1 ≤ t
Tr(F ) = 1
σ, F  0
(13)
However it is not obvious from this form that this is an
SDP. The trick is then to consider how to handle the
trace norm. The trace norm of a square matrix A has a
well known semidefinite program [35]:
minimize Tr(Q) + Tr(R)
subject to Q  A
R  −A
Q,R  0
It is known that the trace norm SDP always achieves the
optimal value in both the primal and dual, which is a
property known as strong duality. This is important as
we need our SDP to have strong duality for tightness (see
Appendix A for more details). With this knowledge, we
can express our SDP:
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to Tr(Γiσ) = γi ∀i ∈ Λ
Tr
(
∆+
)
+ Tr
(
∆−
) ≤ µ
∆+  ΦP(σ)−N (F )
∆−  −(ΦP(σ)−N (F ))
Tr
(
∆
+
)
+ Tr
(
∆
−) ≤ t
∆
+  N (F )−N (F )
∆
−  N (F )−N (F )
Tr(F ) = 1
σ, F,∆+,∆−,∆
+
,∆
−  0
(14)
The dual of this problem is:
maximize ~γ · ~y + f ·~z − aµ− at− b
subject to
∑
i
yiΓi +
∑
j
zjΓ˜j ≤ ∇f(ρ)
−→
N
†
(~z)−
−→
N†(~z) ≤ b~1
− a~1 ≤ ~z ≤ a~1
− a~1 ≤ ~z ≤ a~1
a, a ≥ 0, ~y ∈ R|Λ|
(15)
where f is the vector version of N (F ) and −→N † is the
action as the adjoint of the map N , N †, on the diagonal
entries of a matrix. It is sufficient to consider
−→N † on the
diagonal entries of a matrix because N † only acts on the
diagonal entries of a matrix, and so it is easy to see that
the
−→N † map applied to the vector formed by the diagonal
entries of a matrix gives the equivalent action as N† on
the matrix.
One may note that the objective function of the fi-
nite key SDP is similar to the asymptotic case but with
reductions associated with the finite size effects due to
the variational bound µ and the threshold t as the vari-
ables a, a are non-negative. However this is somewhat
obfuscated when first presented in this general form. We
therefore explain this in relation to the simplified SDP of
a protocol with unique acceptance in the following sec-
tion. We denote the set of (a, a, b, ~y, ~z,~z) which satisfy
the constraints as S∗µ(ρ) for a primal solution ρ to mirror
the asymptotic notation.
With the SDP for finite key analysis determined, it is
crucial to prove that we have preserved the old properties
of tightness, robustness to perturbation to make ∇f(ρ)
exist, and reliability in the face of finite computational
precision. As we have not changed the function f , all
of the theorems pertaining to perturbing the channel to
guarantee ∇f(ρ) exist are unchanged from asymptotic
case, and we direct readers to Ref. [15] for those proofs.
However, the proof of tightness is not identical to that in
[15] and so we state this result here.
9Theorem 2 (Equality of α = β(ρ∗)). If ρ∗ is the mini-
mizer that achieves α, then α = β(ρ∗) where
α ≡ min
ρ∈Sµ
f(ρ)
and
β(σ) ≡f(σ)− Tr(σ∇f(σ))
+ max
(a,a,b,~y,~z,~z)∈S∗µ(σ)
~γ · ~y + f ·~z − aµ− at− b
This guarantees our numerical method obtains the opti-
mal value when the solver works ideally.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note this is not obvious as α is the optimal of the
primal using the original function f(ρ), and β includes
the dual of the linearization of f(ρ).
Lastly, we are concerned with the numerical precision
of the computer which cannot perfectly represent the
POVM elements or statistics and sometimes may return
an answer in the first step that slightly violates some con-
straint. In other words the computer has not optimized
over Sµ, but rather over some different set S˜µ. Without
handling this, our solver could be unreliable, i.e. it could
allow for the solution of step 1 to obtain a value greater
than step 2 in some case. To guarantee this does not
happen, one must expand the set for the dual S∗µ(σ) to
S˜∗µ(σ). The proper method for doing this is to find the
largest constraint violation of the certainty constraints,
which we denote by ζ’.4 Then one must allow every cer-
tainty constraint to vary within that distance as was done
in the asymptotic case: |Tr(ρΓi)−γi| ≤ ζ ′. Furthermore,
one expands µ to µ′ = max(µ+n′, ‖ΦP(ρf )−F‖1 +n′)
where n = |Λ| and ρ is the solution to the first step. We
leave the proof of this statement to Appendix A. This
then guarantees to include the state considered in the
first step. Therefore, we have an SDP to do finite key
analysis which is tight, efficient, and reliable for general
QKD protocols.
D. SDP for Protocol with Unique Acceptance
Many of our examples pertain to protocols with unique
acceptance for clarity in relation to previous work as well
as for clarity of ideas. As in the case of unique accep-
tance the problem simplifies, we derive the SDP for a
4 In the definition of Algorithm 1, ζ was the violation of all con-
straints, but all constraints were certain. Due to the uncertainty
constraints in the finite-case, ζ only applies to the certainty
constraints and then we handle expanding the uncertainty con-
straints accordingly. So as to avoid confusion, we define ζ′ as
the parameter pertaining only to certainty constraint violations
in the finite key case.
QKD protocol with unique acceptance from the general
version above. Most generally, a protocol with unique ac-
ceptance may be viewed as picking N (F ) to be the only
distribution Alice and Bob accept on. Then the con-
straint pertaining to Q in Eqn. 12 vanishes as it must be
the case N (F ) = N (F ). It follows F could be allowed
to vary over all F such that N (F ) = N (F ). However, in
previous works [10, 11, 18, 19], this nuance is lost as only
one coarse-graining is considered, and so it is assumed
F = N (F ). For consistency in the literature, we also
make this assumption in defining a protocol with unique
acceptance. We denote N (F ) by FN to make it clear it
is fixed rather than a variable. Using this notation, we
can define the following set:
SUAεPE ≡ {ρ ∈ Pos(HA ⊗HB) |
‖ΦP(ρ)−N (FN )‖1 ≤ µ, Tr(ρΓi) = γi, ∀i ∈ Λ}
where it must be the case that N coarse-grains data from
the alphabet of FN as otherwise it would not be well-
defined. From this definition we get the following primal
problem:
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to Tr(Γiσ) = γi ∀i ∈ Λ
Tr
(
∆+
)
+ Tr
(
∆−
) ≤ µ
∆+  ΦP(σ)−N (FN )
∆−  −(ΦP(σ)−N (FN ))
σ,∆+,∆−  0
(16)
The dual of this problem is:
maximize ~γ · ~y + f · ~z − aµ
subject to
∑
i
yiΓi +
∑
j
zjΓ˜j ≤ ∇f(ρ)
− a~1 ≤ ~z ≤ a~1
a ≥ 0, ~y ∈ R|Λ|
(17)
where f is the vector version of N (FN ).
The SDP is nearly identical to the asymptotic case as
the first constraint of Eqn. 15 is in effect identical to the
single constraint of Eqn. 9. Similarly, the objective func-
tion is nearly identical, though one can see that there is
some reduction to the key rate associated with the finite
size effects, represented by variational bound µ, as the
variable a is constrained to be non-negative. The con-
straint on ~z is simply the dual problem of the trace norm
simplified using the specific structure of our problem (see
Appendix A for derivation).
E. Coherent Attacks
As one important aspect of finite key analysis is the
ability to analyze the key rate using coherent attacks, it
is important to understand how the numerics can handle
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the coherent attack analysis. Extending the numerical
approach in this work to coherent attacks using the Finite
Quantum de Finetti Theorem [9] can be done by chang-
ing how one defines the variation bound µ and by adding
some extra parameters, as we explain in Appendix C.
However, the Finite Quantum de Finetti approach pro-
vides pessimistic key rates for realistic block sizes. An
alternative method to the Finite Quantum de Finetti the-
orem which provides better, but still pessimistic, bounds
on the key rate is the post-selection technique [36]. This
method effectively states that given ε-security for convex
combinations of i.i.d. states, σ⊗N , which follows from
the security of i.i.d. collective attacks, then the protocol
is ε′ = (N + 1)d
2
AB+1ε-secure for coherent attacks, where
dAB is the dimension of the Hilbert space that Alice and
Bob’s joint state lives in. However, to rigorously use this
method, this either requires the initial protocol to be per-
mutation invariant, or finds a way to bound the portion of
the protocol after parameter estimation by a permutation
invariant version which introduces more ε terms (Section
3.4.3 of [37]). Another technique that handles coherent
attacks is the Entropy Accumulation theorem [38]. How-
ever, this method is not immediately applicable to our
numerical method since it requires a specific property for
the protocol. We leave it as future work to investigate
how to combine the entropy accumulation theorem with
our numerical method. As such, the currently applicable
coherent attack proof methods- the Finite Quantum de
Finetti method and the post-selection technique- while
implementable, are pessimistic and we expect them to
be improved to be significantly closer to the collective
attack results we present in this work. Moreover, this
uplift is independent of our work here, so we concentrate
on the collective attack. In Appendix C we explain how
to lift our results to coherent attacks using the Finite
Quantum de Finetti method.
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section we present variations of the BB84 proto-
col [20] to investigate the properties of finite key analysis
as well as our method. In doing so, we show our method
works for any protocol which can be represented in a
finite-dimensional Hilbert space. This includes single-
photon protocols including single-photon MDI protocols,
and any optical implementation of a protocol which ad-
mits a squashing map [39–41]. Furthermore we show the
power and generality of our method in being able to con-
sider multiple coarse-grainings where each frequency dis-
tribution can be of any length. This is in contrast to
previous works [12, 18, 19] which could only do multi-
ple two-outcome probability distributions without adding
looseness to their calculation of Hµ(X|E) as their bound
on the variation bound µ loosened beyond two-outcome
POVMs. Lastly, in addition to examples of protocols
with unique acceptance, we also present an example
where Q is not a single distribution and discuss when
using our method to calculate key rates of general proto-
cols may be needed in the practical development of QKD
hardware.
In all examples in this section, we let εPE = ε¯ = εEC =
εPA =
1
4×10−8 as we found no general asymmetric choice
consistently improved the key rate substantially. We note
that our method will work for significantly smaller ε val-
ues. The only limitation is numerical precision which
will not be a problem for any realistic ε term given the
equations always depend on the logarithm of the ε term.
For completeness, we present the post-processing
maps, G, for each protocol in Appendix D which are not
difficult to derive following the discussion in Appendix A
of [34].
A. BB84 with Phase Error Parameter Estimation
As a simple case where the analytic answer is known,
we consider the BB84 protocol where signals are sent
in the Z-basis with probability pz and the key map is
only done on the Z-basis so that all other events are re-
moved during generalized sifting [42]. In other words, the
states |0〉 , |1〉 are sent with probability pz2 and the states
|+〉 , |−〉 are sent with probability 1−pz2 . We assume that
Alice and Bob perform parameter estimation in which
they only check the phase error, ex, using the POVM
{Πex ,1−Πex} (18)
where Πex ≡ (1A ⊗ 1B − σX ⊗ σX)/2 and σX is the
Pauli-X operator. An analytical key rate in finite size
for a protocol with unique acceptance has been given for
this scenario in [10]:5
RBB84,ex =p
2
zN [1− h(ex +
µ
2
)− fECh(ez)− δ(ε¯)] (19)
− log2(
2
εEC
)− 2 log2(
1
εPA
)
where Hµ(X|E) = 1 − h(ex + µ2 ), H(X|Y ) = h(ez),
h(p) = −p log2(p)−(1−p) log2(1−p) , and all other terms
are as defined in Section II. The specific form of Hµ(X|E)
follows from the fact that asymptotically the conditional
entropy between the key and Eve for this protocol is of
the form 1−h(ex) and so the worst case-scenario in the fi-
nite regime is that half of the variation bound µ increases
the phase error. The error correction term H(X|Y ) is the
binary entropy of the quantum bit error rate ez because
the number of bits that needed to be corrected when do-
ing the key map from the Z-basis is the error rate in the
Z-basis.
5 In [10] the authors do not have a factor of half for the variation
bound µ in their corresponding formula for Hµ(X|E) (Eqn. 6
of [10]). However, one can tighten their result as if one is to
perturb a probability distribution of two outcomes by a total
amount µ and maintain a probability distribution, the most one
can increase one outcome by is µ/2.
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To show that our approach works, we consider it
against the analytical curve in Fig. 3. Following [10],
to determine the value of µ, we assume Alice and Bob
sacrifice (1 − pz)2N of the signals to parameter estima-
tion. This is a good choice since because as N goes to
infinity, pz can approach zero, and so one will need to
spend a continuously smaller fraction on parameter esti-
mation, which this a priori decision takes into account.
Furthermore, in the simulation we assume that our ob-
servations yield that the error rates satisfy ez = ex to
let H(X|Y ) = h(ex). As can be seen in Fig. 3, for this
protocol our solver produces a lower bound that matches
the analytical result perfectly. Furthermore, in this ex-
ample, we let fEC = 1.2 as this is a realistic model of
the inefficiency of error correction in current experiments
[10, 11, 43].
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FIG. 3. Numerical key rate versus analytic key rate for BB84
for four error rates with εPE = ε¯ = εEC = εPA =
1
4
× 10−8 so
that ε = 10−8. The lines are the theory curves, and the dots
are the corresponding solutions by our numerical method. We
let ez = ex and pz = 0.9. We assume here that the sample
size is still larger than the block length of error correction,
which then gives fEC =1.20.
B. Rotated BB84 & POVM Choice
In this section we explore the effect of fine-grained data
versus coarse-grained data on the key rate and the in-
creased importance of the difference in the finite regime.
Furthermore we show the advantage of considering multi-
ple coarse-grainings (Eqn. 5) rather than only one (Eqn.
1).
In the case of constraining the set of density matri-
ces using a single frequency distribution F , there are two
competing effects— the rate at which the variation bound
µ goes to 0 and the value of the asymptotic key rate. As
one can see from Eqn. 4, the number of POVM outcomes
effects the size of the variation bound µ. This means that
more coarse-grained data FCk has a variation bound µk
that converges to 0 faster than that of the fine-grained
data. It follows that for a case such as in the first ex-
ample where an element of a coarse-grained probability
distribution (ex) determines the key rate (Eqn. 19), the
coarse-grained data will lead to a better or equal key rate
to the fine-grained data for any amount of signals.
However, we know that if one applies a unitary rota-
tion about the Y-axis on the Bloch sphere to each signal
sent to Bob, then the fine-grained statistics will detect
the rotation, thereby leaving the key rate unchanged. In
contrast, the phase error coarse-grained statistics cannot
determine the rotation, thereby decreasing the coarse-
grained key rate. As asymptotically the fine-grained key
rate is better than the coarse-grained key rate in the
event of such a rotation, even with the coarse-grained
statistic variation bound converging to zero faster, the
fine-grained key rate must be better than the coarse-
grained key rate for some number of signals.
Independent of finite size effects, the idea that some
POVMs being robust to rotations has already been rec-
ognized in the literature by the invention of the ‘refer-
ence frame independent’ and ‘6-state 4-state’ protocols
[44, 45]. The idea is that the information extracted by the
POVM determines how robust the protocol is to differ-
ences in Alice and Bob’s reference frames. This is because
the signals sacrificed for the parameter estimation step al-
low them to in effect align their relevant reference frame
[46]. For example, if we had rotated the states about
the X-axis of the Bloch sphere, not even the fine-graiend
data of the BB84 protocol would help, but the six-state
protocol, which is tomographically complete, would be
robust to this. In this section we present an example of
this misalignment in reference frames in BB84 to explore
its relation to finite size effects and the advantage of do-
ing parameter estimation with multiple-coarse grainings.
We consider BB84 where we constrain with one or more
of the following three conditional probability distribu-
tions where for intelligibility we write the corresponding
POVM rather than the conditional probability distribu-
tion:
1. The fine-grained joint POVM constructed by both
Alice and Bob having the local POVM:{
pz
2
|0〉 〈0| , pz
2
|1〉 〈1| , 1− pz
2
|+〉 〈+| , 1− pz
2
|−〉 〈−|
}
(20)
This corresponds to applying the identity condi-
tional probability distribution to the fine-grained
statistics.
2. The phase error POVM defined in Eqn. 18.
This corresponds to mapping the frequencies corre-
sponding to Alice and Bob both using the X-basis
POVM and getting different results to a single out-
come and all other fine-grained outcomes to a sec-
ond.
3. The agreement POVM which simply checks how
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often Alice and Bob agree:
{p2zΠ0, p2zΠ1,
(1− pz)2
2
Π+,
(1− pz)2
2
Π−,Πelse}
where Πa = |a〉 〈a|⊗ |a〉 〈a| and Πelse is the POVM
element that completes the POVM. This corre-
sponds to a conditional probability distribution
that retains the statistics pertaining to Alice and
Bob getting the same outcome and mapping all
other fine-grained outcomes to a single outcome.
To evaluate the resulting key rates, we need to work with
simulated observations, as we do not work from actual
experimental data. To simulate the observed statistics,
we consider a simple noise model for a qubit channel.
Alice sends half of the ideal state |Φ+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
through a channel. The channel is the composition of two
channels. The first channel is the depolarizing channel
with noise value q defined as:
Φqdp(X) =
3∑
k=0
pkσk(X)σk
where p0 = 1 − 3q4 , p1 = p2 = p3 = q4 and σ0 = 12, σ1 =
σX , σ2 = σY, σ3 = σZ where σX , σY, σZ are the Pauli op-
erators. The depolarizing channel induces a qubit error
rate of q in the output state. The second channel is a uni-
tary channel that rotates the state about the Y-axis on
the Bloch sphere by an angle θ, ΦU (X) = e
iθσYXe−iθσY .
Alice and Bob then perform measurements on the state
(idA ⊗ (ΦU ◦ Φqdp))(|Φ+〉 〈Φ+|) using one of the POVMs
previously described to generate the probabilities.
In Fig. 4, we plot the key rate for all three coarse-
grainings individually as well as the key rate when we
consider both the phase-error statistics and the fine-
grained statistics. To look at this, in Fig. 4, whenever
m ≤ 108 we construct a frequency distribution by ran-
domly sampling the simulated probability distribution
using a pseudo-random function and then calculate the
key rate for the protocol with unique acceptance which
accepts on that frequency distribution. To see how much
the key rate fluctuates when sampling m times depend-
ing on the frequency distribution Alice and Bob accept,
we chose to repeat the simulation 20 times to determine
the average key rate and standard deviation of the pro-
tocol with unique acceptance with all other parameters
fixed. The standard deviation is represented by the er-
ror bars in Fig. 4. Furthermore, to make the compari-
son between the different POVMs fair, we optimize the
choice of pz at each point by maximizing the average key
rate over pz given that specific value of N . As in the
previous example, we let m = (1 − pz)2N and assume
they do the key map only in the Z-basis. Lastly, the
(observed) error correction cost for all four key rates is
fECH(X|Y) = fECh(e¯z) where fEC = 1.2 and e¯z is the
bit error frequency determined by the fine-grained statis-
tics in the key-generation basis Z.
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FIG. 4. We consider four different parameter estimation con-
straints for BB84 transmitted through a depolarizing channel
with q = 0.02 when the signal states have been rotated by 12◦
about the Y -axis on the Bloch sphere. Each point has pz nu-
merically optimized for maximum key rate. The error bars are
from checking the key rate for 20 trials of sampling the distri-
bution whenever the number of signals used for parameter es-
timation was less than 108 and calculating the standard devi-
ation. For all curves we let εPE = ε¯ = εEC = εPA =
1
4
× 10−8.
Given Fig. 4, we now see how in some regime coarse-
graining does better than fine-grained data in some
regime due to the coarse-grained variational bound µk
converging to zero faster, but is ultimately worse as N
increases because asymptotically the fine-grained data
provides a better key rate. We also see that considering
both frequency distributions improves the key rate for
all N . This is because whatever density matrix satisfies
both sets of constraints has the phase error lower than
just the fine-grained data and the unitary is ‘undone’ to
a greater degree than just the phase error coarse-grained
data. For this reason in the finite regime it will only be
beneficial to always optimize over the fine-grained data
as well as relevant coarse-grainings. The ability for our
solver to do this regardless of the number of outcomes is
one property which makes our solver truly general.
C. MDI-BB84 with Qubits
In this section we consider the simple extension to
MDI-QKD protocols which are designed to be immune
to side-channel attacks on measurement devices [21].
Specifically we consider MDI-BB84 with perfect single
photon sources in which Alice and Bob both send BB84
states to an untrusted third party Charlie who performs
Bell state measurements on the two signals. Charlie then
announces on which signals his measurement was success-
ful as well as the outcome. Alice and Bob then do sifting
on this subset and finally construct the key. The primary
extension for finite key is that in MDI-QKD there is a
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third party. This means that there is a joint probability
distribution over three alphabets and a joint POVM over
three parties. This however is an immediate extension as
parameter estimation can be defined for tripartite states
and the third party in MDI QKD is a classical announce-
ment and so does not effect Alice and Bob’s fine-grained
data.
To simulate data for the protocol, we apply source-
replacement to both Alice and Bob’s signal states result-
ing in a state ρABA′B′ . In our calculation, we assume the
setup is using linear optics, so Charlie can only discrimi-
nate unambiguously two of the Bell state measurements,
Ψ+ and Ψ− where Ψ± ≡ 1√2 (|01〉 ± |10〉). For simulat-
ing the statistics, we consider that the signal portions of
the states, A′ and B′, each go through a separate depo-
larizing channel Φqdp as they are sent to Charlie. Lastly,
we assume Alice and Bob only do the key map in the
Z-basis for simplicity. In Fig. 5 we consider MDI-BB84
with pz = 0.5 for two depolarizing parameter values to
see the rate of converging to the asymptotic key rate as
a simple example
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FIG. 5. Here we see the MDI-BB84 protocol with unique ac-
ceptance converging to its asymptotic value as the number of
signals is increased for depolarizing channels with depolariz-
ing parameter values q = 0.01 and q = 0.03. For all curves,
the security is defined by εPE = ε¯ = εEC = εPA =
1
4
× 10−8.
D. Discrete-phase-randomized BB84
We next apply our method to optical implementation
of QKD protocols with weak coherent pulses. Since
each state that Bob receives is an optical mode and
is in principle manipulated by Eve, a full description
of the POVM usually involves an infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space (e.g. Fock space). This also means that
the density operator ρAB in our optimization problem is
infinite-dimensional such that no numerical optimization
algorithm can solve the problem directly. Fortunately,
for many discrete-variable QKD protocols, there exists
a squashing model [39–41] that reduces the apparent
infinite-dimensional representation to an effective finite-
dimensional subspace representation. Here, we present
our finite key analysis for the discrete-phase-randomized
BB84 protocol [22], which is based on phase-encoding
and has a squashing model [39].
We consider the following simple model for determin-
ing the statistics.
FIG. 6. Schematic for discrete-phase-randomized BB84. PM
stands for phase modulator, PBS stands for polarizing beam
splitter, BS stands for beam splitter, PR stands for polariza-
tion rotator, and D1 and D2 are two threshold detectors.
As depicted in Fig. 6, the quantum part of the protocol
is
1. Alice sends two-mode coherent states∣∣√νeiθ〉
r
∣∣√νei(θ+φA)〉
s
, to Bob where the first
mode is the reference pulse and the second mode
is the signal pulse. The global phase θ is chosen at
random from the set { 2pikc : k = 0, . . . , c− 1} where
c is the number of different global phases. The key
information is encoded in the relative phase φA
chosen from the Z basis {0, pi} or X basis {pi2 , 3pi2 }.
2. After receiving states from Alice, Bob may choose
to measure in one of the two basis by applying a
relative phase φB ∈ {0, pi2 } to the reference pulse,
where φB = 0 corresponds to Z basis and φB =
pi
2
to X basis. This results in either one, none, or both
of Bob’s detectors clicking. In the case where both
detectors click, Bob assigns the result to either just
detector 1 clicking or just detector 2 clicking.
We remark that the protocol with c=1, in which case
Alice does not randomize the global phase, is also studied
in [47, 48].
For our simulation, we consider a lossy channel pa-
rameterized by the single-photon transmittance η =
10−αattL/10 for a distance L (in kilometers) between Al-
ice and Bob. We also introduce a channel noise param-
eterized by ζ, which describes the relative phase drift
between the signal pulse and the reference pulse. In ad-
dition, imperfection of Bob’s detectors is taken into ac-
count by the dark count probability pd and the dectector
efficiency ηd. To obtain simulated statistics, we choose
ηd = 0.045, pd = 8.5 × 10−7, and let the attenuation
coefficient be αatt = 0.2 dB/km, from the experimental
parameters reported in [49]. We also set ζ = 11◦, which
produces a misalignment error of 1% at 0 km distance
and let fEC = 1.16 as was done in [48].
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Under the squashing model and source-replacement
scheme, the fine-grained statistics for this protocol are
generated by a 20c-outcome joint POVM constructed by
Alice and Bob’s local POVMs where Alice has 4c POVM
elements which are projectors on to her 4c possible signal
states and Bob has a 5-outcome POVM defined as:
{1/2 |0〉 〈0| ⊕ 0, 1/2 |1〉 〈1| ⊕ 0,
1/2 |+〉 〈+| ⊕ 0, 1/2 |−〉 〈−| ⊕ 0, |vac〉 〈vac|}
In other words, Bob’s local POVM is the standard fine-
grained local BB84 POVM (Eqn. 20 with pz = 1/2)
embedded in a three-dimensional space plus a projector
onto the third dimension where the third dimension is
the vacuum state and |vac〉 denotes the basis of the third
dimension.
We take L = 100 km and L = 20 km and consider
both c = 1 and c = 2 scenarios as an example to show
the method works for multiple discrete phases and loss
regimes. In this model the dark counts are the primary
source of error. In generating this plot, to improve the
key rate when less signals are sent, we optimize the frac-
tion of signals that would be used for parameter estima-
tion, which we denote gPE ≡ m/N , heuristically. The
fraction is determined as follows:
gL=20kmPE =
{
0.99 N < 1.31× 1011
1.1×1011
N + (0.5)
log10(N)/4 else
gL=100kmPE =
{
0.99 N < 2.75× 1014
2.35×1014
N + (0.5)
log10(N)/5 else
The first term of line 2 of each gPE was determined by
numerically determining for how many signals the key
rate could be made positive for c = 1. The extra term was
decided so as to sacrifice a smaller fraction to parameter
estimation as N grows so that the key rate is improved.
We notice that with our simulation parameters, at
L = 100 km considered in Fig. 7, a significant amount
of signals needs to be sent before the key rate becomes
nonzero. The reason is that at L = 100 km, the prob-
ability of the outcomes that will lead to key generation
is quite low, at the order 10−6 in the c = 1 case. It fol-
lows that if the variation bound µ is of an order greater
than 10−6, there exists a probability distribution P such
that ‖P − F‖1 ≤ µ and P corresponds to a density ma-
trix that lacks sufficient correlation for any key to be
distilled. Therefore one needs to sacrifice enough signals
to parameter estimation such that the variation bound
µ is sufficiently small with respect to the portion of the
frequency distribution relevant to key distillation.
E. Security of BB84 with Practical Acceptance
Probability
So far we have only presented protocols with unique ac-
ceptance. However, protocols with unique acceptance are
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FIG. 7. Key rate of discrete-phase-randomized BB84 with
unique acceptance when not randomizing the global phase
(c = 1) and randomizing it over 2 choices (c = 2). Every point
is for optimized coherent state intensity ν. For all curves, the
security is defined by εPE = ε¯ = εEC = εPA =
1
4
× 10−8. For
this protocol we let fEC = 1.16.
impractical as the probability that an experiment yields
the exact frequency distribution of outcomes that match
the acceptance criteria is usually very low. Thus one
introduces a range of accepted statistics, where the key
rate is now to be taken over the worst case scenario of
the accepted statistics. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between how often one aborts, and the length of the se-
cret key generated when the protocol does not abort.
In some cases, especially where the accepted statistics is
only based on one observable, such as an error rate, and
the key rate has some monotonic behaviour, it is easy
to identify the worst-case acceptable statistics. In these
cases one can relate the case of a set of accepted statistics
back to the case of a single accepted statistics, namely
the identified worst case statistics. However, in cases
where the observed statistics needed for determining the
key rate of the protocol are more complex, it is often not
as simple to identify the worst case statistics. In these
scenarios, our numerical method is a powerful tool for
determining a tight lower bound of the secret key rate.
Here we present an example of determining the secure
key rate for single-photon BB84 in the practical setting
where multiple frequency distributions are accepted by
Alice and Bob to show how our numerical approach may
help.
We again return to the case where Alice and Bob per-
form BB84 where they choose some probability pz to
send signals in the Z-basis. We consider two sets of fre-
quency distributions to accept corresponding to whether
their protocol has ideal behaviour or is suffering from
misalignment due to the quantum channel. Following
the notation in Eqn. 12, the first set, Q1, is defined by
letting N (F ) be the two-outcome frequency distribution
of ‘phase error’ and ‘no phase error’ with no observed
phase errors (ex = 0). We refer to Q1 as the phase set.
The second set, Q2, is defined by letting N (F ) = F be
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FIG. 8. (a) Key rate of the BB84 protocol for accepting
statistics in Q1 where either just the phase statistics or both
the phase statistics and the fine-grained statistics are used to
determine the key rate. We see in this case the fine-grained
data does not help for this protocol. (b) Key rate of the BB84
protocol for accepting observed statistics in Q2 where either
just the phase statistics or both the phase statistics and the
fine-grained statistics are used to determine the key rate. We
see in this case the fine-grained data help for this protocol,
and so an analytical key rate calculation is difficult. For both
(a) and (b), each point pz is optimized and the security is
defined by εPE = ε¯ = εEC = εPA =
1
4
× 10−8.
the asymptotic results of the fine-grained statistics given
the model from Section IV B. We refer to Q2 as the ro-
tated set. In both cases, the variation threshold, t, is
2(1−pz)2ex where ex is the maximum tolerated observed
error from F . For this example we let ex = 0.02. The
factor of (1−pz)2 is so that the variation threshold stays
the same as pz is varied to optimize the key rate.
Given the definition of the phase set, Q1, the key rate
can be determined analytically as one can replace ex in
Eqn. 19 by ex. Furthermore, as no data more fine-
grained than the phase error is needed in this case, it is
clear that the multiple coarse-grainings will not further
improve the key rate. These observations are verified nu-
merically in Fig. 8a. However, in the case where the ob-
served statistics would be contained in Q2 rather than in
Q1, an analytical tight lower bound of the key rate is not
a reasonable task as the structure of the worst case sce-
nario is no longer simple. This is seen in Fig. 8b, where
our numerical result shows that multiple coarse-grainings
helps to obtain a tighter key rate when Q2 is used. It fol-
lows that obtaining a tight key rate analytically would be
difficult as one needs to utilize both fine-grained statistics
and multiple coarse-grainings.
More generally, this tells us the optimal choice of Q
in certain implementations may be difficult due to issues
such as misalignment errors. In such cases, even in the
honest implementation, the statistics one ought to accept
are fine-grained data that, because of complications, lack
certain symmetries in Alice and Bob’s results. This in
turn limits one’s a priori knowledge of what form the
worst-case scenario observed statistics will take. This is
further aggravated by the trade-off between how often
the protocol will be aborted and the length of the secret
key when the protocol does not abort. For these reasons,
constructing a good choice of Q is a non-trivial task due
to common issues in implementing QKD protocols. As it
is designed for generic protocols, our numerical method
allows for further exploration of these difficulties which
cannot be explored analytically.
V. CONCLUSION
In the utilization of QKD protocols for our future
quantum-safe infrastructure, it is crucial that we can an-
alyze general QKD protocols’ ability to generate com-
posable secret keys in the finite regime. Much work has
already been done on both the framework of finite key
analysis [9, 11, 18] as well as its analysis for specific pro-
tocols using both theory and numerics [6, 10, 13, 19, 50].
However, there has not existed a tool which can deter-
mine the finite key rate for any QKD protocol which can
be represented in finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The
contribution of this work has been to construct such a
tool with the further properties that it always determines
a secure secret key rate (reliability) and can in principle
exactly determine the secret key rate under the security
proof method presented in [9].
We note that the tightness property of our solver is
only up to the security proof method of [9] where the
smooth min-entropy is bounded by the conditional von
Neumann entropy. However, it was shown in [18] that
in some regimes bounding the smooth min-entropy by
the min-entropy can improve the key rate. This method
has also been implemented for a subclass of protocols
numerically in [19]. Therefore, our claim of tightness is
up to the assumption above, although it is easy to see one
can unify our general framework with the min-entropy
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calculation presented in [19] and recover the tightness
property up to this alternative choice.
Beyond the construction of a generic numerical frame-
work for finite key analysis, we note that Theorem 1 in
this paper resolves an issue about this security framework
for finite key analysis. If one were to define the security
using only one set of statistics, as coarse-graining can
be better than fine-grained data, it would follow that
there exist cases in which Alice and Bob throwing out
information is an advantage against Eve. This would be
counter-intuitive. However, we see that the security def-
inition actually would allow Alice and Bob to keep both
versions of the data, and thus the ‘true’ finite key rate can
be seen as constraining over all possible coarse-grainings
which utilizes all possible data from the experiment. The
consideration of the rotated BB84 case exemplifies this
idea.
Lastly, we note that this generic method requires that
one considers probability distributions, but in CV-QKD
one often is interested in a form of coarse-graining which
leads to expectation values of observables rather than a
probability distribution. One would hope there exists
a proof method within the same security definitions
which bounds the expectation values of these specific
observables, even though they are not constructed using
a conditional probability distribution applied to the
initial fine-grained statistics.
Note added: During the preparation of this
manuscript, we noticed a similar work [19] is posted in the
preprint server. Our ideas were conceived independently
and we have presented many of our main results in a con-
ference [51]. We point out that our work is different from
Ref. [19] in how to handle parameter estimation step as
our method handles any number of coarse-grainings of
any length tightly, which is the crucial property for a
general solver in the finite key regime.
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Appendix A: Numerical Methods Proofs
In this Appendix we present the derivations and proofs for the finite key numerical method in detail.
1. Notation
We begin with a brief explanation of notations used in this Appendix. For some arbitrary finite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces X and Y, L(X ) denotes the set of linear maps from X to itself, Herm(X ) ⊆ L(X ) denotes the set of Hermitian
operators acting on X , Pos(X ) ⊆ Herm(X ) denotes the set of positive semidefinite operators, and T(X ,Y) denotes the
set of linear maps that map L(X ) to L(Y). We use uppercase letters like A and B to denote matrices and lowercase
letters like z to denote complex (or real) numbers. For a vector ~v, its j-th entry is denoted by v(j). As already used
in the main text, the inner product on L(X ) is the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product, that is, 〈A,B〉 = Tr(A†B) for
A,B ∈ L(X ). The norm ‖·‖HS is the norm induced by the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product. For a Hermitian matrix
H, let λmin(H) denote the minimum eigenvalue of H.
To ease the writing of matrices in block form, we introduce the following two shorthand notations: We write
diag(A1, A2) for the block-diagonal matrix
(
A1 0
0 A2
)
where A1 and A2 are two square matrices (with possibly different
sizes); we write d˜iag(A1, A2) for the matrix
(
A1 B1
B2 A2
)
whose off-diagonal blocks are irrelevant for our discussion, where
B1 and B2 are some arbitrary matrices of appropriate sizes. These two notations are generalized to a finite number
of (at least two) square matrices.
For an arbitrary square matrix A ∈ L(X ), diag(A) denotes the vector whose entries are given by diagonal entries
of A. For a vector ~z, diag(~z) denotes the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are given by ~z.
For any conditional probability distribution, pΛ|Σ, which would be applied to a probability distribution pΣ, there
exists a completely-positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map representation N such that diag(pΛ|ΣpΣ) = N (diag(pΣ))
[29]. Explicitly, N (X) = ∑x∈Σ,y∈Λ p(y|x) |y〉 〈x|X |x〉 〈y| and a straightforward calculation determines that the
adjoint map is N †(Y ) = ∑x∈Σ,y∈Λ p(y|x) 〈y|Y |y〉 |x〉〈x|. This will be useful in defining the SDP which involves pro-
cessing probability distributions. For this reason in what follows we never define conditional probability distributions
explicitly, but simply the corresponding CPTP map.
2. Semidefinite Program Background
We give a short review the standard form of a semidefinite program and related concepts that will be useful in our
proofs.
Definition: [35] Let Ψ ∈ T(X ,Y) be a Hermitian-preserving map, A ∈ Herm(X ), and B ∈ Herm(Y). A semidefinite
program is a triple (Ψ, A,B), with the following associated optimization problems:
minimize 〈A,X〉
subject to Ψ(X) = B
X ∈ Pos(X )
(A1)
maximize 〈B, Y 〉
subject to Ψ†(Y )  A
Y ∈ Herm(Y)
(A2)
where Ψ† is the adjoint map of Ψ; that is, Ψ† is the unique linear map that satisfies the adjoint equation
〈Y,Ψ(X)〉 = 〈Ψ†(Y ), X〉 for every X ∈ L(X ) and Y ∈ L(Y). Eqn. (A1) is referred to as the primal problem and Eqn.
(A2) is referred to as the dual problem.
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We define A = {X ∈ Pos(X )|Ψ(X) = B} and B = {Y ∈ Herm(Y)|Ψ†(Y )  A}. These sets are referred to as
the feasible set of the primal problem and dual problem, respectively. By weak duality, for all semidefinite programs,
the optimal value of the primal problem, denoted by α, is always greater than or equal to the optimal value to the
dual problem, denoted by β. If a semidefinite program has that α = β, it is said to have strong duality. A sufficient
condition to show strong duality for SDP is Slater’s condition for the standard form presented here.
Theorem 3. (Slater’s Condition) For a semidefinite program (Ψ, A,B), if A 6= ∅ and there exists a Hermitian
operator Y which strictly satisfies the dual problem, that is, Ψ†(Y ) ≺ A, then α = β and the optimal value is obtained
in the primal problem.
3. Numerical Imprecision
We recall two sets of constraints defined in the main text. The set of constraints that are not subject to statistical
fluctuation is denoted by {Γi|i ∈ Λ} and we refer to these constraints as certainty constraints. Constraints {Γ˜j |j ∈ Σ}
that are subject to statistical fluctuation are referred to as uncertainty constraints.
As noted in Sec. III, when one acquires a solution ρf after the first step in Algorithm 1, the answer may not truly be
feasible; that is, ρf is not in the correct set Sµ, but rather in an enlarged set S˜µ. This issue arises from the imprecise
numerical representation of the POVMs as well as the imprecision of the numerical optimization solver which lead
to violation of constraints in the optimization problem. To resolve this issue, one needs to consider the larger set S˜µ
to guarantee that ρf is included. Reference [15] presents a method for the asymptotic case. In Ref. [15], one has to
consider only violations pertaining to certainty constraints {Γi}. In the finite key scenario, we also need to consider
the uncertainty constraints {Γ˜j}. To rigorously account for numerical imprecision, we now adapt the method in [15]
to finite key analysis.
An imprecise solver may lead to a solution ρf which is not positive semidefinite or that does not satisfy these
constraints. To handle the first issue, if the state ρf has negative eigenvalues, one first perturbs the state to be
ρ′f ≡ ρf + |λmin(ρf )|1 so that ρ′f does not have negative eigenvalues. Then one checks the maximum violation of the
certainty constraints of ρ′f , and define sol ≡ max
i∈Λ
|Tr
(
ρ′fΓi
)
− γi|.
Imprecise representations can be seen as deviations from the true POVM and probability representations. One can
therefore denote the imprecise representations as follows:
Γi = Γi + δΓi and γi = γi + δγi,
where ‖δΓi‖HS ≤ 1 and |δγi| ≤ 2 for all i ∈ Λ. By defining rep ≡ 1 + 2, it is shown in Lemma 10 of Ref. [15]
that |Tr(Γi) − γi| ≤ rep,∀i ∈ Λ. One then defines ′ = max(sol, rep) and considers ρ subject to the constraints
{|Tr(ρΓi)− γi| ≤ ′}.
These imprecisions may also lead to violation of the variational distance constraint. Therefore, one should redefine
µ for the second step to guarantee the ρf is considered in the second step. Since the uncertainty constraints pertain
to the variational distance which takes the imprecisions as a whole, to properly enlarge µ to take constraint violations
into account, one can use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality along with Lemma 10 of [15] to expand µ as µ′ = max(µ+
n′, ‖ΦP(ρf )− F‖1 + n′) where n = |Λ|.
Lastly, there is the possibility that the solver finds an optimal solution (σ, F ) such that ‖N (F )−N (F )‖1 > t. In
this case, one should expand t. Thus define t′ ≡ max(t, ‖N (F )−N (F )‖1). Then one defines Sµ′′t′ to play the role
of Sµ by the following:
Sµ′′t′ = {ρ ∈ Pos(HA⊗HB) | |Tr
(
Γiρ
)−γi| ≤ ′ ∀i ∈ Λ, ‖ΦP(ρ)−N (F )‖1 ≤ µ′, ‖N (F )−N (F )‖1 ≤ t′} ⊇ Sµ (A3)
Clearly, if ′ = 0, t′ = t, and µ′ = µ, one reconstructs the original set Sµ. This alternative set is used for deriving the
dual problem in the second step in the following section. By optimizing over this set Sµ′′t′ , we handle the numerical
imprecision related to certainty and uncertainty constraints.
A final remark is that when G(ρ) is singular, the derivative in Eqn. (11) may not exist. To tackle this issue, Ref.
[15] introduces a small perturbation as
G(ρ) ≡ (1− )G(ρ) + 1/d′,
f(ρ) ≡ D
(G(ρ)||Z[G(ρ)]), (A4)
where d′ is the dimension of G(ρ), and  ≥ 0 is chosen in a way such that G(ρ) is not singular. The derivative of f(ρ)
is obtained by replacing G with G in Eqn. (11).
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4. Finite Key SDP
We present the SDP that also takes into account the numerical imprecision discussed above. (However, for ease of
writing, we still use {Γi} to denote certainty constraints and {Γ˜j} to denote uncertainty constraints.) For simplicity,
we present here derivations in the case of one variation bound and state the result related to multiple coarse-grainings
in Sec. A 6.
The primal problem of our SDP at ρ ∈ Sµ′′t′ is
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to Tr(G) + Tr(H) ≤ µ′
G  ΦP(σ)−N (F )
H  N (F )− ΦP(σ)
Tr
(
G
)
+ Tr
(
H
) ≤ t′
G  N (F )− FN
H  FN −N (F )
Tr(F ) = 1
|Tr(Γiσ)− γi| ≤ ′ ∀i ∈ Λ
σ, F,G,H,G,H  0.
(A5)
where FN ≡ N (F ). We use this notation to emphasize N (F ) is fixed and is not an optimization variable because F
and N are both fixed. Let α0(ρ) denote the optimal value of this primal problem. To derive its dual problem, Eqn.
(A5) can be reformatted to fit the definition of Eqn. (A1) as follows:
A = diag(∇f(ρ),0)
B = diag(µ′, 0, 0, t′, FN ,−FN , 1,
∑
i
(+ γi) |i〉 〈i| ,
∑
i
(− γi) |i〉 〈i|)
Ψ(X) = diag(Tr(G) + Tr(H) + z,−G−N (F ) + ΦP(σ) + I,−H +N (F )− ΦP(σ) + J,Tr
(
G
)
+ Tr
(
H
)
+ z,
−G+N (F ) + I,−H −N (F ) + J,Tr(F ),Φ0(σ) +M1,−Φ0(σ) +M2)
X = d˜iag(σ, F,G,H, z, I, J,G,H, z, I, J,M1,M2)
(A6)
where 0 is a shorthand notation to mean that all other blocks are zero matrices of appropriate size, Φ0(X) ≡∑
i∈Λ Tr(XΓi) |i〉〈i|, N (X) =
∑
x,y p(y|x) |y〉 〈x|X |x〉 〈y|, N (X) =
∑
x,y p(y|x) |y〉 〈x|X |x〉 〈y|, and z, z ∈ C, I ∈
L(C|Σ|), J ∈ L(C|Σ|), I ∈ L(C|ΣC |), J ∈ L(C|ΣC |), M1 ∈ L(C|Λ|) and M2 ∈ L(C|Λ|) are slack variables. Furthermore
ΣC represents the alphabet for the coarse-graining. It is easy to verify using the definition of adjoint map, 〈Y,Ψ(X)〉 =
〈Ψ†(Y ), X〉, that the adjoint of Ψ is:
Ψ†(Y ) = diag(Φ†0(W1 −W2) + Φ†P(K − L),N †(L−K) +N
†
(K − L) + b1W , a1W −K,
a1W − L, a,K,L, a1W −K, a1W − L, a,K,L,W1,W2)
(A7)
where Y = d˜iag(a,K,L, a,K,L, b,W1,W2),
Φ†0(W ) =
∑
i∈Λ
W (i, i)Γi, Φ
†
P(V ) =
∑
j∈Σ
V (j, j)Γ˜j (A8)
If we substitute these definitions in the standard form of SDP [in Eqns. (A1) and (A2)] and flip signs of
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a, a, b,K,L,K, and L, we then get the following dual problem:
maximize 〈
∑
i∈Λ
(′ + γi) |i〉〈i| ,W1〉+ 〈
∑
i∈Λ
(′ − γi) |i〉〈i| ,W2〉+ 〈FN , L−K〉 − µ′a− t′a− b
subject to
∑
i∈Λ
[W1(i, i)−W2(i, i)]Γi +
∑
j∈Σ
[L(j, j)−K(j, j)]Γ˜j  ∇f(ρ)
N †(L−K)−N †(L−K)  b1W
0  K  a1W 0  K  a1W
0  L  a1W 0  L  a1W
a, a ≥ 0, W1,W2  0,
(A9)
where W ≡ C|Σ|. Let β0(ρ) denote the optimal value of this dual problem.
From Eqn. (A9), we observe that off-diagonal entries of K, L, K, L, W1 and W2, are not important for this
optimization problem since for any optimal solution Y ∗ = d˜iag(a∗,K∗, L∗, a∗,K
∗
, L
∗
, b∗,W ∗1 ,W
∗
2 ) of this problem,
if K ′, L′,K
′
,L
′
, W ′1 and W
′
2 are matrices obtained by taking only the diagonal parts of K
∗, L∗,K
∗
, L
∗
,W ∗1 and
W ∗2 , respectively, then the matrix Y
′ = diag(a∗,K ′, L′,K
′
, L
′
,W ′1,W
′
2) is also optimal as it is feasible and achieves
the same optimal value. Moreover, we may optimize over the difference L − K (L − K) subject to the constraint
−a1W  L−K  a1W (−a1W  L−K  a1W) as only the difference L−K (L−K) matters in the optimization
and its range is −a1  L −K  a1 (−a1  L −K  a1) which is determined by the two constraints 0  K  a1
and 0  L  a1 (0  K  a1 and 0  L  a1). If we write ~γ as the vector whose i-th entry is γi and f = diag(FN ),
the dual problem in Eqn. (A9) is simplified as
maximize (′ + ~γ) · ~y1 + (′ − ~γ) · ~y2 + f ·~z − µ′a− t′a− b
subject to
∑
i∈Λ
[y1(i)− y2(i)]Γi +
∑
j∈Σ
z(j)Γ˜j  ∇f(ρ)
−→
N
†
(~z)−
−→
N†(~z)  b~1
− a~1 ≤ ~z ≤ a~1
− a~1 ≤ ~z ≤ a~1
a, a ≥ 0 ~y1, ~y2 ≤ ~0.
(A10)
where
−→N † is defined such that diag(N †(Z)) = −→N †(diag(Z)) for arbitrary Z ∈ L(C|ΣC |). We remark that when ′ = 0,
we can replace ~y1 and ~y2 by ~y ≡ ~y1 − ~y2 subject to the constraint ~y ∈ R|Λ|. When µ′ = µ, t′ = t, and ′ = 0, Eqn.
(A10) reduces to Eqn. (15) in the main text after this replacement.
5. Reliability and Tightness
We now prove that the lower bound using the linearization is tight for the finite key SDP. That is, in the limit where
the numerical imprecisions go away, the program will obtain the true answer. In this section we present the precise
mathematical statement of tightness for the SDP in Eqn. 14 in Theorem 4 which considers the issues of numerical
imprecision discussed in Sec. A 3. The extension to multiple coarse-grainings is then straightforward. This theorem
is a finite-size version of Theorem 3 in Ref. [15]. In proving this theorem, we will adapt the proofs in Appendixes D
and E of [15] as well as technical lemmas in Appendixes A-C of [15].
As our optimization problem comes from a physical scenario and we are only interested in the situation where the
set Sµ′′t′ is not empty (otherwise we may trivially set the key rate to be zero), we restrict our attention to this
situation.
Theorem 4. (General Proof of Tightness of Numerical Method) Let Sµ′′t′ be defined in Eqn. (A3) and assume
Sµ′′t′ 6= ∅. Let ρ ∈ Sµ′′t′ where G(ρ) is of size d′ × d′ and ′ > 0. For 0 <  ≤ 1/[e(d′ − 1)], then
α ≥ βµ′′t′(ρ)− ζ (A11)
where
α = min
σ∈Sµ
f(σ), (A12)
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βµ′′t′(σ) ≡ f(σ)− Tr[σ∇f(σ)] + max
(a,a, ~y1, ~y2,~z,~z,b)∈S∗µ′′t′(σ)
[(′ + ~γ) · ~y1 + (′ − ~γ) · ~y2 + f ·~z − µ′a− t′a− b], (A13)
and
ζ ≡ 2(d′ − 1) log2
d′
(d′ − 1) . (A14)
The set S∗µ′′t′(σ) is defined by
S∗µ′t′′(σ) ≡{(a, a, ~y1, ~y2, ~z,~z, b) ∈ (R,R,R|Λ|,R|Λ|,R|Σ|,R|Σ|,R)|
a, a ≥ 0,−a~1 ≤ ~z ≤ a~1,−a~1 ≤ ~z ≤ a~1, ~y1 ≤ 0, ~y2 ≤ 0,∑
i∈Λ
[y1(i)− y2(i)]Γi +
∑
j∈Σ
z(j)Γ˜j  ∇f(σ),
−→
N
†
(~z)−
−→
N†(~z)  b~1}
(A15)
Moreover, if ρ∗ is an optimal solution to the primal problem,
lim
→0+
lim
′→0+
µ′→µ
t′→t
[βµ′t′′(ρ
∗)− ζ] = α. (A16)
We note that the statement of tightness in the main text (Theorem 2) is for when there are no numerical
imprecisions. Theorem 4 is a generalization of that theorem that handles numerical imprecisions as well.
To prove Theorem 4, we first show that for any ρ ∈ Sµ′t′′, the primal optimal value α0(ρ) is equal to the dual
optimal value β0(ρ) as Lemma 5. Then, we break down the proof of theorem into two parts: reliability in Eqn. (A11)
and tightness in Eqn. (A16).
Lemma 5. If Sµ′′t′ 6= ∅, then α0(ρ) = β0(ρ) for any ρ ∈ Sµ′′t′ .
Proof. As Sµ′′t′ 6= ∅, to apply Slater’s condition, we just find a strictly feasible solution to the dual problem.
We consider the dual problem in the form of Eqn. (A9). Let a = a = 3. Let W1 = diag(x − 3,−1,−1, ...,−1)
where x = −|λmin(∇f(ρ))|. Thus W1 ≤ 0. Let W2 = −1 ≤ 0. Without loss of generality, let Γ1 = 1 as we
always have the constraint Tr(σ) = 1 in the primal problem. Let L = 21 and K = 1.Thus −a1W ≺ L −K ≺ a1W .
Furthermore,
∑
j [K(j, j)−L(j, j)]Γ˜j = 1 as {Γ˜j} is a POVM. Thus,
∑
i[W1(i, i)−W2(i, i)]Γi+
∑
j [K(j, j)−L(j, j)]Γ˜j =
(x − 1)1 ≺ ∇f(ρ) by construction of x. Let L = 21, K = 1 and b = 2. Then −a1W ≺ L − K ≺ a1W and
N †(L −K) − N †(L −K) = 0 ≺ b1W . The last equality followed from the fact N is a quantum channel and so its
adjoint is unital. Thus all inequalities are strictly satisfied.
We now adapt the proof in Appendix D.3 of [15] to finite-key scenario.
Lemma 6. In the context of Theorem 4, α ≥ βµ′′t′(ρ)− ζ for any ρ ∈ Sµ′′t′ , which is Eqn. (A11).
Proof. Let αµ′′t′ ≡ min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
f(σ). Suppose that ρ
∗
µ′′t′ ∈ Sµ′′t′ is an optimal solution of this optimization. For any
ρ ∈ Sµ′′t′ , since f is convex,
αµ′′t′ = f(ρ
∗
µ′′t′) ≥ f(ρ) + 〈(ρ∗µ′′t′ − ρ),∇f(ρ)〉
≥ f(ρ)− 〈ρ,∇f(ρ)〉+ min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
〈σ,∇f(ρ)〉
= f(ρ)− 〈ρ,∇f(ρ)〉+ α0(ρ)
= f(ρ)− 〈ρ,∇f(ρ)〉+ β0(ρ) = βµ′t′′(ρ),
(A17)
where first two inequalities follow from the same argument about this linearization of our convex objective function
as it is used in Eqns. (77)-(79) of Ref. [15] and the last line follows from Lemma 5 and the definition of βµ′t′′(ρ).
Since Sµ ⊆ Sµ′′t′ ,
α = min
σ∈Sµ
f(σ) ≥ min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
f(σ) ≥ min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
f(σ)− ζ = αµ′′t′ − ζ, (A18)
where the last inequality follows from a continuity argument (which is Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 in Ref. [15]). Combining
this result with Eqn. (A17) leads to Eqn. (A11).
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As we have shown the reliability of our numerical method, we now proceed with the tightness in Eqn. (A16). If ρ∗
is an optimal solution, an immediate consequence of Lemma 6 is that for any ρ ∈ Sµ′′t′ , the following equation holds:
min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
Tr[(σ − ρ∗)∇f(ρ∗)] ≤ 0. (A19)
As Eqn. (A19) holds for any feasible density operator in the set Sµ′′t′ ⊇ Sµ, we want to show that if ρ∗ optimizes
the objective function f , then min
σ∈Sµ
Tr[(σ − ρ∗)∇f(ρ∗)] = 0 where the optimization is over Sµ as Eqn. A16 pertains
to the limit where that is the set we are interested in. Therefore we just need to prove
min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
Tr[(σ − ρ∗)∇f(ρ∗)] ≥ 0 (A20)
when Sµ′′t′ 6= ∅.
Lemma 7. When Sµ′′t′ 6= ∅,
min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
Tr[(σ − ρ∗)∇f(ρ∗)] ≥ 0 (A21)
Proof. Let Sµ′′t′ 6= ∅. By Lemma 5, we know that Eqn. A5 obtains its optimal value. Let ρ∗ optimize f over
Sµ′′t′ 6= ∅. As f is a differentiable, convex function (one may consider f to guarantee differentiability), it is the case
that for all σ ∈ Sµ′′t′ , Tr[∇f′(ρ∗)(σ − ρ∗)] ≥ 0 (Eqn. 4.21 of [52]). It follows min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
Tr[(σ − ρ∗)∇f(ρ∗)] ≥ 0
Eqn. (A19) and Lemma 7 imply that, given ρ∗ that optimizes f over Sµ′′t′ ,
min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
Tr((σ − ρ∗)∇f(ρ∗)) = 0
We can therefore conclude the following:
f(ρ∗) = f(ρ∗) + min
σ∈Sµ′′t′
Tr[(σ − ρ∗)∇f(ρ∗)]
= f(ρ∗)− Tr(ρ∗∇f(ρ∗)) + max
(a,a, ~y1, ~y2,~z,~z,b)∈S∗µ′′t′ (ρ∗)
[(′ + ~γ) · ~y1 + (′ − ~γ) · ~y2 + f ·~z − µ′a− t′a− b]
= β(ρ∗)
this completes the proof of Eqn. A16 and Theorem 4.
6. Multiple Coarse-Grainings
We now can show that it is easy to extend to the case where one considers multiple coarse-grainings. First, we
define Σf as the alphabet indexing the fine-grained statistics of the experiment. Let k index the set of conditional
probability distributions pertaining to coarse-grained data, {pΣk|Σf }k. Each conditional probability distribution
induces a channel Nk which applies the coarse-graining to the statistics. Define the POVM which pertains to the
kth conditional probability distribution as {Γ˜kj }j∈Σk which induces a measurement channel ΦPk . In this case j is
implicitly dependent on k as different coarse-grainings will construct probability distributions of different sizes. Then,
the primal problem may be written as:
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to Tr(Γiσ) = γi ∀i ∈ Λ
‖ΦPk(σ)−Nk(Fk)‖1 ≤ µk ∀k
‖N (Fk)−N (F )‖1 ≤ t ∀k
Fk  0 ∀k
σ  0
(A22)
where ΦPk(X) ≡
∑
j∈Σk Tr
(
XΓ˜kj
)
|j〉 〈j|, Nk(X) =
∑
x∈Σf ,y∈Σk pΣk|Σf (y|x) |y〉 〈x|X |x〉 〈y|. We stress that Fk is
indexed by k given the set considered in Theorem 1.
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To convert this linearized primal problem into a semidefinite program, we effectively are just optimizing k copies
of Eqn. A5 at the same time. This means we can write the equivalent form of Eqn. (A5):
minimize 〈∇f(ρ), σ〉
subject to Tr(Gk) + Tr(Hk) ≤ µ′k ∀k
Gk  ΦPk(σ)− Fk ∀k
Hk  Fk − ΦPk(σ) ∀k
Tr
(
Gk
)
+ Tr
(
Hk
) ≤ t′k ∀k
Gk  N (Fk)− FN ∀k
Hk  FN −N (Fk) ∀k
|Tr(Γiσ)− γi| ≤ ′
Fk, Gk, Hk, Gk, Hk  0 ∀k
σ  0
(A23)
where we have let t′k be indexed by k in case different coarse-grainings violate the Q set by different amounts.
To reformat Eqn. (A23) into the definition in Eqn. (A1) we can extend the definitions in Eqn. (A6) in a block
diagonal fashion using the matrix direct sum, ⊕, over k.
A = diag(∇f(ρ), 0)
B = diag(⊕kµk,⊕k0,⊕k0,⊕kt,⊕kFN ,⊕k − FN ,⊕k1,
∑
i
(+ γi) |i〉 〈i| ,
∑
i
(− γi) |i〉 〈i|)
Ψ(X) = diag(⊕k[Tr(Gk) + Tr(Hk) + zk],⊕k[−Gk −Nk(Fk) + ΦPk(σ) + Ik],⊕k[−Hk +Nk(Fk)− ΦPk(σ) + Jk],
⊕k [Tr
(
Gk
)
+ Tr
(
Hk
)
+ zk],⊕k[−Gk +N (Fk) + Ik],⊕k[−Hk −N (Fk) + Jk],⊕k Tr(Fk),
Φ0(σ) +M1,−Φ0(σ) +M2)
X = d˜iag(σ,⊕kFk,⊕kGk,⊕kHk,⊕kzk,⊕kIk,⊕kJk,⊕kGk,⊕kHk,⊕kzk,⊕kIk,⊕kJk,M1,M2)
It is straightforward to see the adjoint map of Ψ in this case is
Ψ†(Y ) = diag(Φ†0(W1 −W2) +
∑
k
Φ†Pk(Kk − Lk),⊕k[N
†
k (Lk −Kk) +N
†
(Kk − Lk) + bk1W ],⊕k[ak1W −Kk],
⊕k [ak1W − Lk],⊕kak,⊕kKk,⊕kLk,⊕k[ak1W −Kk],⊕k[ak1W − Lk],⊕kak,⊕kKk,⊕kLk,W1,W2)
where
Y = d˜iag(⊕kak,⊕kKk,⊕kLk,⊕kak,⊕kKk,⊕kLk,⊕kbk,W1,W2)
Finally, again because all of the ks are independent, this dual problem is ultimately simplified to:
maximize
∑
k
f ·~zk + (′ + ~γ) · ~y1 + (′ − ~γ) · ~y2 − ~µ · ~a− ~t · ~a− ‖~b‖1
subject to
∑
i
[y1(i)− y2(i)]Γi +
∑
k
(
∑
j
zk(j)Γ˜
k
j )  ∇f(ρ)
−→
N †(~zk)−
−→
N †k (~z) ≤ bk~1W ∀k
− ak~1W ≤ ~zk ≤ ak~1W ∀k
− ak~1W ≤ ~zk ≤ ak~1W ∀k
~a,~a ≥ 0 ~y1, ~y2 ≤ 0
(A24)
where ~µ′ is just the vector whose k-th entry is given by µ′k. From these forms, it is clear that strong duality and
tightness proofs follow from the single POVM case by indexing over the variable k and scaling things properly.
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Appendix B: Derivations of Terms
In this section we derive the terms in the keyrate which differ from previous works.
Theorem 8. To construct a set of states, Sµ (Eqn. 1), such that the complement of the set, Sµ, satisfies the property
that ∀σ ∈ Sµ, σ⊗m is εPE-securely filtered, it is sufficient that µ =
√
2
√
ln(1/εPE)+|Σ| ln(m+1)
m .
Proof. By Theorem 11.2.1 of [53], given an empirical probability distribution f constructed from sampling i.i.d.
random variables from a probability distribution p which has |Σ| outcomes,
Prob[D(f ||p) > ] ≤ 2−m(−|Σ| log2(m+1)m )
Furthermore, Lemma 11.6.1 of [53] states: √
2 ln 2D(f ||p) ≥ ‖f − p‖1
Therefore,
Prob
[
‖f − p‖1 >
√
2 ln 2
]
≤Prob
[√
2 ln 2D(f ||p) >
√
2 ln 2
]
≤2−m(−|Σ| log2(m+1)m )
≡εPE
Then, except with probablity εPE, ‖f − p‖1 ≤
√
2 ln 2 ≡ µ. We now just solve for µ using arithmetic:
εPE = 2
−m( µ22 ln 2−|Σ| log2(m+1)/m
⇒ µ =
√
2
√
ln(1/εPE) + |Σ| ln(m+ 1)
m
Derivation of δ(ε¯)
Our version of δ(ε¯) arises from the correction of a typo in Theorem 3.3.6 of [9] and then stopping midway through
the derivation of Corollary 3.3.7 of [9] so as to have the prefactor 2 log2(d + 3) instead of 2d + 3. As the typo in
Theorem 3.3.6 was already noted in [10], we simply state the corrected theorem:
Theorem 3.3.6 of [9]: Let ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗HB), σB ∈ D(HB), and n ∈ N. Then for any ε ≥ 0,
1
n
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n|σ⊗n) ≥ H(ρ)−H(ρB)−D(ρB ||σB)− δ
where δ = 2 log2(rank(ρA) + Tr
(
ρ2(1A ⊗ σ−1B )
)
+ 2)
√
log2(2/ε)
n .
We now give our version of Corollary 3.3.7, which is the original proof but without adding looseness so as to write
it in terms of max-entropy:
Theorem 9. (Variation of Corollary 3.3.7 of [9]) Let ρXB ∈ D(HX ⊗ HB) be a classical-quantum state. Then for
any ε ≥ 0,
1
n
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
XB |ρ⊗nB ) ≥ H(XB)−H(B)− δ
where δ = 2 log2(rank(ρX) + 3)
√
log2(2/ε)
2 .
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume ρB is invertible as the general statement follows by continuity.
1X ⊗ ρB − ρXB =
∑
x∈X
(1X − |x〉 〈x|)⊗ ρxB ≥ 0
Thus, by an operator inequality (Lemma B.5.4 of [9]), we know
λmax(
√
ρXB(1X ⊗ ρ−1B )
√
ρXB) ≤ 1
As Tr(ρXB) = 1,
Tr
(
ρ2XB(1X ⊗ ρ−1B )
)
= Tr
(
ρXB(
√
ρXB(1X ⊗ ρ−1B )
√
ρXB)
) ≤ 1
It therefore follows:
log2(rank(ρA) + Tr
(
ρ2XB(1X ⊗ ρ−1B )
)
+ 2) ≤ log2(rank(ρX) + 3)
Plugging this value into Theorem 3.3.6 completes the proof.
Appendix C: Coherent Attack Analysis
As noted in the main text, if one were to use the Finite Quantum de Finetti theorem to bound the coherent attack,
there are a few minor changes from the presentation in the main text which is for collective attack. Namely, there
is the introduction of another security term εQdF, a different way to calculate the correction term δ(ε¯) as well as µ,
and two new parameters r and k which need to be chosen appropriately. To show that it can be handled, we briefly
discuss where each change arises.
The first aspect is that the Quantum de Finetti theorem itself is a probabilistic statement about the distance
between a subsystem of a large state and a state which is a convex combination of i.i.d. states. This probability,
which we refer to as εQdF, must then be included. In this case, we can therefore rewrite Theorem 6.5.1 of [9] so ε
terms are explicit:
Theorem 6.5.1 [9] Given a general QKD protocol as defined in the main text where a total of N signals are
transmitted, m of the signals are used for parameter estimation, and n of the signals are used for key generation, let
k ∈ N and bn+m+k = N where b accounts for block-wise processing. Let ε¯, εEC, εPA, εPE, εQdF > 0. Then the QKD
protocol is (εQdF + εPE + ε¯+ εEC + εPA)-secure if the error correction is εEC-secure and if
` ≤ n[Hµ(X|E)− δ(ε¯)]− (m+ k) log2(dim(HA ⊗HB))− leakεEC − 2 log2(
1
εPA
)
where
µ ≡ 2
√
h
( r
m
)
+
log2(1/εPE) + |Σ| log2(m2 + 1)
m
(C1)
δ(ε¯) ≡ (5
2
log2(d) + 4)
√
h(r/n) +
2
n
log2(4/ε¯) (C2)
r ≡
(
bn+m
k
+ 1
)(
2 ln
(
2
εQdF
)
+ (dim(HA ⊗HB)2 ln(k)
)
− 1 ≤ N (C3)
Proof. See [9].
As can be seen from the statement of the theorem, the key rate will be lower from that of the collective attack
as the correction term δ(ε¯) and variation bound µ will be larger for any fixed m for the finite key analysis. This is
largely due to the binary entropy terms which depend on r. To make r small, one must either let εQdF be large, or
sacrifice many of the N signals to make k large. Physically, this ‘sacrifice’ is to throw out a large portion of the signal
states to make the rest of the system close enough to a mixture of i.i.d. signals.
Given this theorem, all one needs to do to use our numerical solver with the Finite Quantum de Finetti theorem
is replace the variation bound in Eqn. 4 with Eqn. C1, the correction term from Eqn. 3 with Eqn. C2, add the
(m+ k) log2(dim(HA ⊗HB)) term to calculating the key length, and optimize over k such that r ≤ N .
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Appendix D: Post-processing Maps for Examples
In this section we provide the post-processing maps, G for each example for completeness. As explained in [15], the
post-processing map G can be decomposed into three operations on a state ρ (see Appendix A of [34] for an in-depth
derivation):
• The isometric quantum channel A which represents the measurements of Alice and Bob as well as their parti-
tioning of resulting data into public and private information.
• A projection Π on their public data which represents the general sifting step.
• A partial isometry V which acts on the subspace spanned by Π which models the key map applied by Alice or
Bob.
Then from these G is defined as G(·) = VΠA(·)ΠV †. Lastly we note that the channel A(·) = ∑a,b(KAa ⊗KBb )(·)(KAa ⊗
KBb )
† where KAa =
∑
αa
√
PAa,αa ⊗ |a〉A˜ ⊗ |αa〉A, KBb =
∑
βb
√
PBb,βb ⊗ |b〉B˜ ⊗ |βb〉B , where the spaces with a tilde
denote public information and spaces with a bar denote private information as in Fig. 1. aα denotes the outcome
α given public announcement a, and PAa,αa denotes the (fine-grained) measurement Alice would have done to have
public information a and private information α. The notation is the same for Bob. We refer to Appendix A of [34]
for a further discussion of the post-processing framework.
1. Single-Photon BB84
The examples in Sections IV A and IV B use the same map G. In singe-photon BB84, Alice and Bob perform von
Neumann measurements in the Z and X bases with probabilities pz and 1 − pz respectively, the public information
Alice and Bob announce are what bases they measure in, the private information is what outcome they got (represented
by a 0 or 1) in both bases, and the sifting throws out any measurement where Alice and Bob did not use the same
basis. Lastly we note that in Sections IV A and IV B, we assumed Alice only performs the key map in the Z-basis.
Therefore we have the following definitions for constructing the G map:
KAZ =
√
pz |0〉 〈0|A ⊗ |0〉A˜ ⊗ |0〉A +
√
pz |1〉 〈1|A ⊗ |0〉A˜ ⊗ |1〉A
KAX =
√
1− pz |+〉 〈+|A ⊗ |1〉A˜ ⊗ |0〉A +
√
1− pz |−〉 〈−|A ⊗ |1〉A˜ ⊗ |1〉A
KBZ =
√
pz |0〉 〈0|B ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ |0〉B +
√
pz |1〉 〈1|B ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ |1〉B
KBX =
√
1− pz |+〉 〈+|B ⊗ |1〉B˜ ⊗ |0〉B +
√
1− pz |−〉 〈−|B ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ |1〉B
Π = |0〉 〈0|A˜ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|B˜ + |1〉 〈1|A˜ ⊗ |1〉 〈1|B˜
V = |0〉R ⊗ |0〉 〈0|A˜ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|A ⊗ |0〉 〈0|B˜ + |1〉R ⊗ |0〉 〈0|A˜ ⊗ |1〉 〈1|A ⊗ |0〉 〈0|B˜
We note that while we used the source-replacement method, we used the Gram-Schmidt process to return Alice’s
space to the original size as explained in [26], which in this case reconstructs Alice’s original POVM.
2. MDI BB84
For MDI BB84, as we consider the case where Alice and Bob only distill key from the Z basis, using the source-
replacement scheme on both Alice and Bob’s sources and the simplification rules explained in Appendix A of [34],
there is only one Kraus operator for the entire map G:
KZ = (|0〉R ⊗ |0〉 〈0|A + |1〉R ⊗ |1〉 〈1|A)⊗ (|0〉 〈0|B + |1〉 〈1|B)⊗ (|0〉 〈0|C + |1〉 〈1|C)
3. Discrete-phase-randomized BB84
In the discrete-phase-randomized BB84, we begin from the use of the squashing model which results in Alice
preparing 4 states for each global phase, and Bob having the 5-outcome POVM described in Section IV D. Then by
the source-replacement scheme on Alice, Alice’s portion of the signal is a 4c-dimensional Hilbert space HA where c is
the number of global phases Alice uses. In other words, HA ∼= ⊕cH4 where H4 is a 4-dimensional Hilbert space and
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⊕ is the direct sum. To make the expression of the Kraus operators concise, define the projector Πn = |n〉〈n| where
n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Then, using that Alice performs the key map along with the simplifications from Appendix A of [34],
we have two Kraus operators which describe the action of G:
KZ = |0〉R ⊗
(⊕
c
(Π0)
)
⊗√pz(|0〉 〈0|B + |1〉 〈1|B)⊗ |0〉A˜ + |1〉R ⊗
(⊕
c
(Π1)
)
⊗√pz(|0〉 〈0|B + |1〉 〈1|B)⊗ |0〉A˜
KX = |0〉R ⊗
(⊕
c
(Π2)
)
⊗
√
1− pz(|+〉 〈+|B + |−〉 〈−|B)⊗ |1〉A˜
+ |1〉R ⊗
(⊕
c
(Π3)
)
⊗
√
1− pz(|+〉 〈+|B + |−〉 〈−|B)⊗ |1〉A˜
where ⊕cΠn is well defined for all n as Πn ∈ H4 and HA ∼= ⊕cH4.
